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ABSTRACT
The wireless radio channel is typically thought of as a means to move information 
from transmitter to receiver, but the radio channel can also be used to detect changes 
in the environment of the radio link. This dissertation is focused on the measurements 
we can make at the physical layer of wireless networks, and how we can use those 
measurements to obtain information about the locations of transceivers and people.
The first contribution of this work is the development and testing of an open 
source, 802.11b sounder and receiver, which is capable of decoding packets and using 
them to estimate the channel impulse response (C IR ) of a radio link at a fraction 
of the cost of traditional channel sounders. This receiver improves on previous im­
plementations by performing optimized matched filtering on the field-programmable 
gate array (FPGA) of the Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP), allowing it 
to operate at full bandwidth.
The second contribution of this work is an extensive experimental evaluation of 
a technology called location distinction, i.e., the ability to identify changes in radio 
transceiver position, via CIR measurements. Previous location distinction work has 
focused on single-input single-output (SISO) radio links. We extend this work to 
the context of multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) radio links, and study system 
design trade-offs which affect the performance of MIMO location distinction.
The third contribution of this work introduces the “exploiting radio windows” 
(ERW) attack, in which an attacker outside of a building surreptitiously uses the 
transmissions of an otherwise secure wireless network inside of the building to infer 
location information about people inside the building. This is possible because of the 
relative transparency of external walls to radio transmissions.
The final contribution of this dissertation is a feasibility study for building a 
rapidly deployable radio tomographic (RTI) imaging system for special operations
forces (SOF). We show that it is possible to obtain valuable tracking information 
using as few as 10 radios over a single floor of a typical suburban home, even without 
precise radio location measurements.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Radio Frequency Sensing in Wireless Networks
Wireless networks permeate the world around us. The past two decades have 
seen extensive expansion of cellular networks to cover most urban areas around 
the world and many rural areas as well. We use local area networking (LAN) 
technologies like WiFi to connect our personal computers and handhelds to the 
internet. We use personal area networking (PAN) technologies like Bluetooth to 
connect peripheral devices to our computers or stream audio from our cell phones. We 
also leverage wireless sensor networks (WSNs) for tasks as diverse as detecting forest 
fires [1], tracking the migration and mating patterns of animals [2], and monitoring 
the structural health of buildings and bridges [3].
All of these wireless networks transmit information at radio frequency (RF), i.e., 
between 3 kHz and 300 GHz, typically less than 6 GHz. In most cases, to the 
dismay of wireless communications engineers, these RF transmissions are distorted 
by their environment. Objects in the environment, including human beings, reflect, 
diffract, and attenuate these transmissions. Moving objects produce Doppler dis­
tortion. Typically, it is the job of the wireless communications engineer to design 
modems that mitigate the effects these distortions have on the packets of data being 
push around the network, via equalization for example. However, it is also possible 
to leverage the distortions in RF transmissions caused by the environment to “sense” 
the environment.
A commonly used model that captures the distortions of wireless signals caused 
by the environment is the channel impulse response (CIR). The CIR of a wireless 
link is linear representation of the “echoing” that an RF transmission experiences as
2it follows multiple paths from the transmitter to the receiver, known as multipath 
propagation [4]. Its complex baseband representation can be written as
N (t)
h(t,T ) =  ^  ai(t)8(t -  Ti(t)) (1.1)
i= 1
where, at time t, N (t) represents the number of paths, a i (t) the complex gain of 
the ith path, Ti (t) represents the corresponding time delay, and 8 is the Dirac delta 
function.
The effects of objects in the environment are apparent in measurements that 
estimate the CIR. For example, when a person moves in the environment of a wireless 
link, she will effect some subset of the multipath for the radio link, thereby changing 
their contribution to (1.1). Figure 1.1 illustrates multipath propagation in a single 
room.
Ultra wide-band (UWB) radar devices create very accurate estimates of the CIR 
by transmitting very short (in time) RF pulses, in order to approximate an impulse, 
and listening for reflections [5]. The high bandwidth signals employed by these devices 
allow them to very accurately localize reflectors in the environment.
However, lower bandwidth signals are also useful for detecting and localizing 
objects. WiFi signals with bandwidths of 20-40 MHz have been a used to measure 
the channel and detect changes in transceiver position [6,7], as well as the motion and 
position of people that are not carrying radios [8]. The lower bandwidth signals used 
in these papers translates to the use of a lower-order approximation of the impulse 
function in (1.1), since a true impulse requires infinite bandwidth. The channel 
sounder developed as a part of this dissertation replaces the impulse function with 
the waveform shown in Figure 1.2.
Another common metric used to detect changes in wireless transmissions is re­
ceived signal strength (RSS). RSS is an estimate of the power of the transmission 
measured at the receiver. The measured power results from multiplying the trans­
mitted power by the squared magnitude of the phasor sum of all of the multipath 
contributions, written as
Pr =  Pt
N(t)




3where PR, PT, and f  represent the received power, transmitted power, and center 
frequency, respectively.
Changes in the mean and variance of RSS have been be used to track the locations 
of people who are not carrying radios [9,10]. This kind of localization has been called 
“device-free localization” (DFL), as it does not require the targets of the localization 
to carry a device. This attribute makes DFL highly valuable in the realms of law 
enforcement, security, home automation, retail analytics, and in-home monitoring of 
the elderly.
1.2 Leveraging RF Measurements for Location 
Classification
Several methods have been introduced in the literature that leverage RF measure­
ments to infer location information. The following examples employ RSS measure­
ments for location classification.
• In [11], WiFi clients are localized indoors via RSS measurements from multiple 
access points (APs).
• In [12], RSS measurements made at multiple APs are used to detect the motion 
of people who are not carrying radio devices and localize them to spatial regions 
within a small office building.
• In [10], a wireless mesh network surrounding a building is used to localize people 
moving within the building.
Other methods have been introduced which utilize the CIR or its Fourier pair to 
infer location information:
• In [13], the authors use frequency response measurements between the WiFi 
clients and nearby APs to localize the clients.
• In [6] and [14], the authors use CIR estimates to perform location distinction,
i.e., determining if the position of a transceiver has changed.
• In [15], the authors use channel frequency response measurements to defend 
against Sybil attacks.
41.3 Contributions of this Dissertation
This dissertation focuses on the physical layer measurements we can make on the 
RF links that exist in wireless networks, as well as some of the ways that we can 
leverage these measurements in order to obtain information about the physical loca­
tions of people in the vicinity of the network and the transceivers that comprise the 
network. The publications, accepted and under submission, that have resulted from 
this work, as well as the specific contributions made by this author, are summarized 
below.
1. D. Maas, M.H. Firooz, J. Zhang, N. Patwari, and S.K. Kasera, “Channel Sound­
ing for the Masses: Low Complexity GNU 802.11b Channel Impulse Response 
Estimation,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, 2012. [16]
RSS measurements are often used in the literature because they are made 
available at the application layer of the network stack by most wireless de­
vices, requiring no special hardware to measure. The same is not true of CIR 
measurements. Although CIR measurements are very often made by RF devices 
for the purpose of equalization, these measurements are not made available at 
the application layer. It has therefore been necessary for researchers to build 
their own “channel sounders” in order to build prototypical systems that utilize 
CIR measurements.
In this work, I helped build and test an open source 802.11b receiver and 
channel sounder, capable of estimating channel impulse responses from standard 
transmissions, including debugging the FPGA design and signal processing 
through experimental validation. This work is included as Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation.
2. D. Maas, N. Patwari, J. Zhang, S. Kasera, and M. Jensen, “Location Distinction 
in a MIMO Channel,” in Proc. 2009 Virginia Tech Wireless Symp. Student 
Poster. [17]
D. Maas, N. Patwari, S.K. Kasera, D. Wasden, and M. Jensen, “Experimental 
Performance Evaluation of Location Distinction for MIMO Links,” in Proc.
54th IEEE International Conference on Communication Systems and Networks 
(COMSNETS), 2012. [18]
It is possible to use CIR measurements to perform location distinction because 
these measurements are directly related to the physical arrangement of the 
transceivers and interfering objects in the environment and are also spatially 
unique in an environment that contains many interfering objects. If two CIR 
measurements for the same radio link differ significantly, it is likely that the 
transmitter or receiver has moved during the interval between measurements. 
It is also possible to discriminate between changes in transceiver position and 
changes in the environment because changes in transceiver location affect all 
of the reflective paths traversed, while changes in the environment only affect 
some subset of the paths.
In this work, I explored the design space for location distinction using two dif­
ferent MIMO testbeds, leading to an understanding of how location distinction 
performance scales with transmission bandwidth and number of antennas, as 
well as other insights. This work is included as Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
3. A. Banerjee, D. Maas, M. Bocca, N. Patwari, S.K. Kasera, “Exploiting Radio 
Windows for Through-wall Location Information,” (submitted Sep. 2013) IEEE 
Transactions on Networking.
The RF transmissions from many of our wireless networks are able to prop­
agate through exterior walls, they create so-called “radio windows,” exposing 
some information about the locations of people inside the buildings where the 
networks are deployed. This location information can be inferred from passive 
RF measurements made with receivers placed on the outside of the building.
In this multiple-author collaborative research project, I developed an algo­
rithm capable of detecting the motion of people across through-wall WiFi 
links, including the ability to accurately count the number of times a person 
crosses the line-of-site of the link and determine the person's direction of motion 
relative to a single through-wall MIMO link. I led experiments and performed
6analysis to validate the methodology. This work is included as Chapter 4 of 
this dissertation.
4. D. Maas, J. Wilson, N. Patwari, “Toward a Rapidly Deployable RTI System for 
Tactical Operations,” in Proc. 8th IEEE International Workshop on Practical 
Issues in Building Sensor Network Applications (SenseApp), 2013. [19]
Previous work on radio tomographic imaging has been focused on tracking 
results obtained by complicated and sensitive research-driven systems, in which 
radio locations must be measured precisely and the system must be properly 
calibrated before use.
In this work, I conducted an extensive feasibility study for making a rapidly 
deployable and robust RTI system for special operations forces (SOF) like 
SWAT. I performed a variety of experiments to determine whether or not the 
radios can self-localize and calibrate on-the-fly and still yield the tracking results 
necessary to make the system useful to SOF. This work is included as Chapter 
5 of this dissertation.
An addendum to the published paper, which includes additional tracking results 
and link budget information, is included in Appendix A.
In support fot the research projects listed above, I have developed, implemented, 
and/or tested several channel measurement systems. These include:
• USRP /  GNU Radio Channel Sounder: FPGA code for the USRP (v1) to 
estimate the CIR from received 802.11b signals, code that is publicly available 
at h ttp ://sp a n .ece .u ta h .ed u /d ow n loa d /fo rm 7 .h tm l.
• MIMO Measurements for Location Distinction: A system that measures the 
channel response on each antenna pair of a 2x2 MIMO link, using LabView and 
National Instruments V SA /V SG  hardware.
• MIMO /  OFDM Measurements using CSI Tool: A laptop-based system that 
measures the channel state information for up to a 3x3 MIMO link, with 30 
complex-valued channel state values from each antenna pair, using an Intel 
5300 WiFi card and drivers available at [20].
7• High TX  Power WSN: A Texas Instruments CC2530/CC2590-based system 
with directional antennas for through-building RTI.
• Multitransceiver SISO Channel Sounder: A pseudo noise (PN)-based multiple- 
transceiver 20 MHz channel sounder using a network of National Instruments 
VSAs/VSGs.
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8Figure 1.1. A diagram illustrating the multipath propagation of RF transmissions. 
The transmission follows many paths from the transmitter (TX) to the receiver (RX), 
each of which is determined by the environment. A person, modeled here as a cylinder 
with diameter D, attenuates the line-of-site (LOS) component.
F igure 1.2. The finite bandwidth pulse used in an 802.11b channel sounder.
CHAPTER 2
CHANNEL SOUNDING FOR THE 
MASSES: LOW COMPLEXITY 




New techniques in cross-layer wireless networks are building demand for ubiquitous 
channel sounding, that is, the capability to measure channel impulse response (CIR) 
with any standard wireless network and node. Towards that goal, we present a 
software-defined IEEE 802.11b receiver and CIR measurement system with little 
additional computational complexity compared to 802.11b reception alone. The 
system implementation, using the universal software radio peripheral (USRP) and 
GNU2 Radio, is described and compared to previous work. We validate the CIR 
measurement system and present the results of a measurement campaign which 
measures millions of CIRs between WiFi access points and a mobile receiver in urban 
and suburban areas.
2.2 Introduction
Channel impulse response (CIR) measurements have long held importance for 
communication system design [21-23]. The CIR describes the spreading, or echoing, 
that occurs when an impulse is sent through a channel. This spreading in time can
1©[2012]. Reprinted, with permission, from D. Maas, M.H. Firooz, J. Zhang, N. Patwari, and 
S.K. Kasera, “Channel Sounding for the Masses: Low complexity GNU 802.11b channel impulse 
response estimation,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, 2012.
2GNU is a recursive acronym for GNU is not unix.
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lead to intersymbol interference (ISI), and frequency-selective or narrow band fading, 
depending on the symbol bandwidth. A knowledge of the CIR characteristics enables 
system designers to ensure that ISI does not dominate and hence lead to an excessive 
irreducible bit error rate [24]. Multipath channels can also be used to increase the 
bit rate and reliability of multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) communications 
systems. Accurate MIMO channel models can be built from CIR measurements [25], 
and can be used to improve MIMO system design [26]. In general, measurements 
of CIR in wireless networks have become increasingly important to determine the 
real-world performance of many new technologies.
In addition, new cross-layer wireless networking technologies use measurements of 
the multipath channel for purposes of environmental awareness and security, such as 
fingerprint-based localization [27], RF-based multistatic radar [28], location distinc­
tion [29], secret key establishment [30]. These applications require CIR measurements 
to be performed in real time using commercial wireless devices, as opposed to with 
specialized measurement equipment or in postprocessing. Typical commercial wireless 
devices use the received signal in a demodulator to estimate the transmitted bits, but 
then discard the received signal samples. Information about the channel (besides the 
received signal strength) is not forwarded to higher networking layers, nor can it be 
estimated from the demodulated bits. For the mentioned applications to be viable, 
future commercial wireless devices must be able to rapidly calculate CIR information.
In this paper, we present the design of an inexpensive CIR measurement sys­
tem. It is built upon GNU Radio, an open source framework for software-defined 
radio [31,32], and the Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP), an open-source 
transceiver platform [33]. Compared to signal analyzers and oscilloscopes (a 3-GHz 
vector network analyzer (VNA) can cost US $20,000), our system is low cost. The 
cost of the proposed system is US $975 [34], which enables large-scale deployment as 
might be seen in a typical WiFi deployment. Our system works seamlessly with 
standard physical (PHY) layer signals from commercial 802.11b wireless devices. 
Essentially, our system provides an 802.11b receiver with the additional capability 
of CIR estimation.
However, this paper is not limited in scope to the USRP -  the implementation
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presented enables practical CIR estimation in hardware with strict computational 
limitations, such as field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) or application-specific 
integrated circuits (ASICs). It will not be feasible to compute a CIR estimate 
with commercial 802.11 hardware unless the computational complexity is low. The 
open-source platform chosen is an advantage, we believe, because it is likely to 
lead to cooperative improvement in the system capabilities and large-scale adoption. 
Providing a system implementation that works within the limitations of the hardware 
platform is, in part, a demonstration of the feasibility of the approach in future 
commercial systems.
The CIR measurement system we present in this paper for 802.11b is similar to 
sliding correlator channel sounding method in which a known pseudo noise (PN) 
signal is generated and continuously transmitted from a transmitter to the receiver 
[21,35]. However, our work is different from the existing method in the following four 
significant ways:
1. The PN sequence in 802.11b is fixed and not designed for high dynamic range 
CIR estimation.
2. Devices transmitting in 802.11b send PN-coded symbols modulated with data; 
modulation is undesirable from the perspective of CIR estimation.
3. Unlike sliding correlator measurement systems, which calculate the full cross­
correlation signal after thousands of PN signal periods, our system calculates 
the full cross-correlation signal during each PN signal period [35].
4. No specialized transmitter is required, as any standard 802.11b transmitter 
(e.g., laptop or access point) may be used.
Note that IEEE 802.11b devices must support two mandatory bit rates (1 Mbps and
2 Mbps) and may optionally support two higher rates (5.5 Mbps and 11 Mbps) as 
specified in [36]. In this work, for simplicity, we only consider the standard rates. 
We note that the start of any 802.11b packet and some 802.11g packets (the first 
192 symbols, known as the PLCP2 frame), are sent at either the 1 or 2 Mbps rate.
2 Physical Layer Convergence Procedure
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Thus many packet sources exist which our system implementation can utilize for CIR 
estimation.
In a similar, but independent project, a channel sounder for 802.11b applications 
is reported in [37], which begins by recording the samples of a 192-bit segment of 
the 802.11b signal onto a PC. Then, the signal is despread and demodulated on 
the PC. Next, the transmitted signal for the 192-bit segment is recreated using the 
demodulated bits. Finally, the recorded received signal and recreated transmitted 
signal are convolved. Since both have many samples, the cross-correlation consumes 
significant PC computation time, on the order of N B  log(N B ), where N  is the number 
of samples per bit, and B  is the number of bits used. In comparison, our system 
involves PC computation on the order of N B . The system proposed in [37] uses 
proprietary software and VHDL implementations (ComBlock products from Mobile 
Satellite Services Inc.), while our implementation uses open-source hardware and 
software with a wide user base that utilizes and contributes to the code library. As 
an open source platform, our code has been downloaded from our website 1140 times 
since its first posting.
Our specific contributions to 802.11b CIR estimation system research are summa­
rized as follows:
1. We provide an implementation of an 802.11b FPGA matched filtering method, 
the first, to our knowledge, to be presented for the USRP-based GNU Radio 
framework.
2. We provide a method to estimate the CIR from a modulated 802.11b signal. 
In particular, we use the output of the receiver’s matched filter, which allows a 
lower-complexity CIR estimate compared to [37].
3. We perform extensive measurements, in both lab-controlled and real-world 
multipath channels.
2.3 Analysis Methods
In this section, we present a detailed analytical framework for CIR estimation 
using received 802.11b signals. We describe an 802.11b signal, how it is impacted by a
13
multipath channel, and how the proposed system estimates both: (1) the transmitted 
data, and (2) the amplitudes and delays of the multipath in the channel. This signal 
framework is used throughout this paper.
2.3.1 T ran sm itted  Signal
The 802.11b physical layer uses direct-sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) modula­
tion with symbol duration of Ts =  1^s. This transmitted symbol stream is multiplied 
by a pseudo-noise (PN) code signal, which also has duration Ts. Denoting the PN 
code signal as c(t) and the jth  transmitted data symbol as bj, the transmitted signal 
in baseband is given by
s(t) =  ^  bj c(t -  jT s) - (2.1)
j
Note that bj generally takes complex values, because data symbols may be modulated 
either using differential binary phase-shift keying (DBPSK) or differential quadrature 
phase-shift keying (DQPSK). Although our work is developed and tested for DBPSK, 
it is readily extendible to DQPSK.
The PN code in 802.11b is called the Barker code. This code consists of eleven 
chips, each with duration Tc =  Ts/11 ^s, thus ’’ spreading” the bandwidth of the 
transmitted signal to eleven times the original bandwidth. The Barker code signal is 
a modulated sequence of pulses,
10
c(t) =  ^  ap(t -  iTc), (2.2)
i=0
where p(t) is the pulse shape, and c  E {+ 1 , - 1 }  as given in [36]. The pulse shape is 
chosen to meet the bandwidth limitations imposed by the 802.11b standard, but the 
precise shape of p (t ) is left to the designer. In this paper, when it is necessary to use 
a particular pulse shape, we have chosen to use a square root raised cosine (SRRC) 
pulse with roll-off factor a  =  0.5, which meets the spectral mask requirements and 
represents a good trade-off between temporal and frequency domain characteristics
[38].
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2.3.2 R ece iv ed  Signal
Because of the multipath radio channel, many copies of the transmitted signal 
arrive at the receiver with different time delay, amplitude, and phase. The multipath 
channel filter is modeled as [39]:
L-1
h(t) =  ^  aiS(t -  Ti), (2.3)
i=0
where L is the total number of multipath components, a l =  |ai|ejZai is the complex 
amplitude gain of the 1th multipath, t 1 is the delay of the 1th multipath, and £(•) is 
the Dirac delta function. Since we are only interested in the relative time delay of 
each multipath, we let t 0 =  0, and then t 1 is the additional delay compared to the 
first arriving multipath.
The received signal r(t) is the convolution of the transmitted signal and the 
channel filter. Applying (2.3) and (2.1),
L-1
r(t) =  s(t) k h(t) =  ^  ^  aibjc(t -  ti -  jTs). (2.4)
l=0 j
An 802.11b receiver “de-spreads” the signal, i.e., performs matched filtering with 
the PN code signal c(t) from (2.2), which results in signal q(t),
L-1
q(t) =  r(t) k c ( - t )  =  ^  ai ^  bjRc(t -  t  -  jT s), (2.5)
i=0 j
where Rc(t) =  c(t) k c ( - t )  and Rc(0) is the energy in the signal c(t), which we denote 
Ec.
Standard 802.11b receivers must perform despreading, i.e., the calculation of q(t), 
in order to perform demodulation. We propose that q(t) can be used directly in CIR 
estimation as well. By using an output that existing 802.11b receivers compute, we 
make it more feasible for future 802.11b receivers to estimate CIR without significant 
additional computational complexity.
We note that it is possible to estimate CIR from all symbols comprising the PLCP 
preamble and header. If the PLCP is known a priori, the reception range can be 
significantly increased by correlating with the entire PLCP, rather than c(t). In this 
case, the “energy per bit” is essentially increased by a factor of 48, a 17 dB increase.
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In this work, we present a CIR measurement system that works with any 802.11b 
transmitter, thus we cannot know the PLCP ahead of time. Further, correlating with 
the entire PLCP adds computational complexity.
The above formulation has not included interference. Inevitably, some packets will 
be unable to be received due to low SINR, and thus the CIR will not be estimated. 
Further, the SINR can be estimated from a received packet, and CIR estimates can 
be dropped if the desired SINR is not achieved.
2.3.3 C IR  E stim ation
The estimation of CIR from a received 802.11b signal is complicated by the 
modulated data {b j}. That is, the PN code signal is modulated with data, pre­
sumably unknown to the receiver until after demodulation. For example, for BPSK, 
bj E { - 1 ,  + 1 }. In this section we first present the (unrealistic) case of an unmodulated 
signal, i.e., where bj =  1 for all j . We then describe how we estimate the CIR from 
a modulated 802.11b signal.
First, for an ideal unmodulated signal, (2.5) would simplify to
L-1
q(t) =  ^  a tRpn(t -  ti), where Rpn(t) =  ^  Rc(t -  jT s). (2.6)
1=0 j
Here, Rpn is the correlation of a PN code signal with a repeating PN code signal with 
period Ts. The Barker code has the property that this correlation function Rpn(t) 
peaks at t =  0 and integer multiples of Ts and is almost constant in between those 
peaks [40]. Figure 2.1(a) shows the signal q(t) when there is exactly L = 1  path with 
amplitude a 0 =  1. As multipath components correspond to time-delayed versions of 
q(t), the almost constant correlation in between peaks makes it possible to identify 
multipath contributions even when their magnitude |aj| is small.
When dealing with modulated signals, the correlation q(t ) may not be nearly 
constant between peaks, making low-amplitude multipath components harder to 
identify. In Figure 2.1(b), we use the transmitted symbols b  =  [1,1, -1 ,1 ,1 ] ,  and 
plot the correlation output signal q(t) from (2.5), for the case that L = 1  and a 0 =  1. 
Note that the normalized amplitude of q(t) between the 2nd and 3rd peaks, and 
between the 3rd and 4th peaks, rapidly change between ±1 /11 . These periods of
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varying correlation correspond to the times in between changes in symbol values bj. 
When bj =  bj+1, the value of q(t) for jT s <  t <  ( j +  1)Ts is not almost constant.
However, note that when bj =  bj+1, there is a nearly constant -1 /1 1  correlation 
value in between the two peaks at jT s and ( j +  1)Ts. When subsequent symbols are 
identical, the almost constant correlation value in q(t) can be exploited for improved 
CIR estimation. To avoid the negative impact of symbol modulation, we use the 
correlator output signal q(t) whenever the symbol value bj repeats.
To be explicit, define two correlation functions, Ro(t) and Rs(t) (shown in Figure 
2.2), as:
R o(t) =  (Rc(t) — Rc(t — Ts))I (0,Ts) (2.7)
R s(t) =  (Rc(t) +  Rc(t — Ts))I (0,Ts)
where I(0,Ts)(t) has value 1 at interval (0 ,Ts) and zero elsewhere. We also define two 
subsets, Js =  { j  : bj =  bj+1} for symbol integers j  when the next symbol value 
repeats, and Jo =  { j  : bj =  bj+1}. Then we can write (2.5) as
L-1
q(t) =  ^  bj ^  a iRs(t -  jT s -  T ) 
jeJs i=o
L-1
+  bj a iRo(t — jT s — Tl) - (2.8)
jeJ0 i=o
This version of q(t) contains terms R s(-) and Ro(■) that have support only over one 
symbol period. We estimate the CIR by averaging only the symbol periods of q(t) 
that correspond to repeated symbol values:
1 L- 1 
h(t) =  m  bj q(t -  jT s)I (o,Ts)(t) ~  X !  a i R s(t -  Ti) (2.9)
1 s| jeJs i=o
Essentially, the channel estimator in (2.9) averages together only the impulse re­
sponses estimated during periods when the symbol value is not switching and thus 
the correlation function is nearly constant. Note that symbol values bj do not affect 
h(t). In the ideal case, the channel estimate is a sum of time-delayed, attenuated, 
and phase-shifted versions of R s(t). However, in a given hardware implementation, 
R s(t) may be affected by other filters, known or unknown, in the receiver chain. If
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the overall filter of the receiver chain is unknown, it may be beneficial to estimate 
R s(t) using a known channel, i.e., an interference-free cabled connection between the 
transmitter and receiver. We employ this method to generate an estimate of Rs(t) 
from a single packet, which we call Rs(t).
The CIR estimate h(t) in (2.9) is a convolution of the true CIR in (2.3) with 
R s (t), which has a zero-to-zero pulse width of approximately 188 ns. Since multipath 
arrive more closely spaced than 188 ns, the complex-valued, time-delayed pulse shapes 
R s(t — ti) overlap in time, making it difficult to visually inspect h(t) to identify 
multipath arrival delays.
We apply a deconvolution procedure based on [41] to estimate multipath time 
delays. This procedure is described in detail in [42]. In short, we discretize the CIR 
and write the measurement as a linear combination of the CIR amplitudes. Then, 
we solve a quadratic optimization problem using the well known convex optimization 
software [43] to perform the inversion.
The sampled measurement is written as,
L-1
h[n] =  ^  a tRs(nTs — t  ) +  w[n] (2.10)
1=0
where w[n] is measurement noise, assumed to be i.i.d. Gaussian. Equation (2.10) 
can be written as h =  R sa  +  w, where [Rs]k;1 =  Rs(kTs — t ) is an M  x  L matrix, 
a  =  [a1;. . . ,  a L]T, and w  is an M-dimensional noise vector. An estimate of a  is the 
solution to the following optimization problem [41,42],
a  =  min ||h — R sa ||2 +  A |a|1 (2.11)
a
where A is a fixed parameter, the inverse of a Lagrange multiplier [44], which is set 
as discussed in [41].
2.4 Implementation
In this section, we present the system implementation of the WiFi-based receiver 
and CIR estimator using the proposed FPGA matched filtering method on a USRP. 
The USRP receiver path consists of a 64 M S/s (million samples per second) 12-bit 
ADC, an Altera Cyclone FPGA, and a USB controller. The USB 2.0 bandwidth is not
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sufficient to stream an 802.11b signal sampled at the Nyquist rate. However, the rate 
limitations of a USB 2.0 link do not limit transfer of 802.11b symbol information, since 
symbols are sent at 1 Msymbols/s [45]. The spreading via DSSS adds no information, 
but causes the RF bandwidth to increase by a factor of 11. To reduce the received 
signal to samples at 1 M S/s, we must first despread on the FPGA. After despreading, 
symbol decisions can be made using only one sample per symbol, and, as we will 
show, a subset of samples per symbol can be used for CIR estimation.
A broad overview of the signal processing steps is shown in Figure 2.3. We first 
reduce the sampled data r(t) to 32 MS/s. Then, we despread using (2.5). The output 
q(t) has a sample rate of 32 M S/s, however, not every sample is necessary, so we send 
only samples near the peaks in q(t), as described in detail in this section.
The result is that the average data rate sent to the PC is within the rate limitations 
of a USB 2.0 link. The PC then performs the symbol detection and bit decoding 
operations as specified in the IEEE 802.11b standard. Our receiver implementation 
can consistently receive 802.11b packets sent at the 2 Mbps rate, and the reception 
range is up to 20 m.
We compare our implementation to previous work [46], which we call the bandwidth 
reduction method. In this method, r(t) is filtered and downsampled to a 8 MHz RF 
bandwidth, smaller than the RF bandwidth of the DSSS signal. Then, the samples 
are at a rate low enough to be transfered over USB to be processed on a PC. The 
downsampling reduces the range of the receiver, as we show in Section 2.5.
The main computational challenge in the proposed method is the implementation 
of matched filtering on the FPGA. We propose a computationally-efficient method 
to implement the 802.11b matched filter, valid for the strict limitations of the given 
FPGA, or any computationally limited ASIC or FPGA implementation. We describe 
three ways in which the implementation reduces computational complexity and data 
rate yet still provides a high-capability system implementation: multiplication reduc­
tion; use of two memories; and peak selection.
2.4.1 M u ltip lica tion  R ed u ction
A direct implementation of the matched filter in (2.5) would require 32 multiplies 
and additions per sample. We reduce the complexity as follows. Figure 2.4 shows
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c(t) and its sampled version, c(iTs). We quantize each sample of the PN code 
signal, c(iTs), and denote the quantized values as cq(iTs). In our implementation, 
we chose quantization to five bits, in a trade-off between resolution and multiplier 
space complexity.
Some values of |c(iTs)| are similar enough, that when quantized to five bits, 
|cq(iTs)| =  |cq(jT s)| for some j  =  i. Since summation is simpler than multiplication 
in an FPGA, it saves both time and complexity to first add (or subtract) samples 
with identical |cq| value, and then multiply the sum by its |cq| value.
31 15
q(nTs) =  ^  cq(iTs)r((n -  i)Ts) =  ^  cg
9=1i=0
^  sgn { cq(iTs) } r ((n -  i)Ts)
ieSg
(2.12)
where q(nTs) is the nth sample of the match filter output q(t), S9 is the set of all 
indexes in the gth group, sgn {■} is the signum function, and c9 is the multiplicative 
factor cq(iTs) for all i E S9. The S9 and c9 for each group g are listed in Table 2.1. 
Using this rearrangement, we require 15 multiplications, instead of the 32 that would 
be required in a direct implementation.
2.4.2 T w o  M em ories
An FPGA requires parallelization in order to complete the several additions and 
multiplications required at each new sampling time. Our implementation allows 
two clock cycles (clock rate of 64 MHz) per sampling time (sampling rate of 32 
M S/s). During these two clock cycles, we must perform addition and multiplication 
as described above, and shift samples to allow space for the new incoming signal 
sample.
For this purpose, we use two 32-length arrays, which we refer to as mem and 
bmem. When a new sample is received, it is located at mem[0] while mem[1] to 
mem[31] are filled by bmem[0] to bmem[30]. In the next cycle, mem[0] to mem[31] 
are put in bmem[0] to bmem[31]. This process is depicted in Figure 2.5. As explained 
in the previous paragraph, we first add the data in bmem, by group g, which is 
completed in one cycle. Then, multiplication by group multiplier c9 is performed, 
and the results summed.
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2.4.3 Peak  S election
The output of the FIR filter, q(nTs), has a 32 M S/s rate. With a sampling period 
of 31.25 ns, we capture 344 ns (much more than the typical excess delay for short-range 
channels [47]) of the signal within 11 samples. These 11 samples per symbol can be 
reliably transfered via USB.
The peak selection algorithm selects 11 out of each 32 samples per symbol as 
follows. First, the FPGA computes the power values |q(nTs)|2, n =  1 , . . . ,  32. The 
index of samples with maximum power is denoted nmax =  argmaxn |q(nTs)|2. The 
FPGA sends through the USB the samples from three samples before to seven samples 
after the peak power sample, i.e., {q ((n max +  i)Ts) } 7=-3 .
Note that the proposed CIR measurement system finds samples near the maximum- 
power peak, not necessarily the line-of-sight (LOS) path. In a non-LOS dominant 
channel, if the LOS path arrives within three samples prior to the maximum-power 
peak, the proposed system records the full CIR.
2.5 Experimental Results
In all cases, we load an Ettus Research USRP (rev 4.5) with the code described 
in Section 2.3.3. The RF front end is a RFX2400 daughterboard (rev 30), also 
from Ettus Research. The antenna is a 2400-2480 MHz sleeve dipole antenna with 
omnidirectional pattern in the horizontal plane and a 3 dBi gain. The USRP is 
connected to a Dell Inspiron laptop running Python and Matlab. The Python (GNU 
Radio) code collects data from the USB, demodulates the packet data, and writes to a 
file. The Matlab code performs the averaging required in (2.9) and then displays and 
stores the impulse response estimate h(t). From the stored h(t), the deconvolution 
described in Section 2.3.3 is performed in postprocessing.
2.5.1 D em od u la tor
We do not proceed with CIR estimation when packet data do not pass the CRC 
test. Equally important, the MAC address of a transmitter is included in the packet 
header, and this is necessary to distinguish packets originating from different transmit­
ters. In this section, we measure the packet reception rate (PRR) of the implemented 
802.11b CIR measurement system in an interference-free environment.
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We configure a test transmitter, a D-Link 802.11b wireless router (model DI- 
614+), to broadcast a beacon packet at a basic rate (1 or 2 Mbps) every 200 ms (5 
packets/sec). The router and receiver are placed in a shielded anechoic chamber and 
separated by 6.0 m. The packet reception rate is recorded for three minutes, and 
experiment repeated four times. The implementation presented in this paper receives 
an average of 724 packets, while the bandwidth reduction method receives an average 
of 454. The results show that the FPGA matched filtering method outperforms the 
bandwidth reduction method by successfully demodulating 1.6 times more packets.
2.5.2 C hannel M easurem en t
In this section we first perform two experimental validations on our implemen­
tation using known channels between the transmitter and the receiver. Then, we 
perform an experimental measurement campaign to measure a large number of CIRs 
in outdoor areas in and around Salt Lake City, Utah. We provide measurement results 
and summarize the measured delay characteristics.
2.5 .2 .1  V alidation
To validate the CIR estimation system, we create two channels with known impulse 
response out of RF hardware and cable, with which we connect the wireless router 
(transmitter) and receiver.
In the single-path experiment, the transmitter is connected to an attenuator, 
whose output is connected via cable to the receiver. We record several measured CIR 
estimates h\(t). Figure 2.6-(a) shows three measurements hi(t) and the estimated 
CIR for a single-path channel, Rs(t). Since h\(t) is nearly identical to Rs(t), it is 
apparent that the channel has only one path, i.e., L = 1 .  Figure 2.6-(b) presents the 
deconvolved CIR estimate from (2.11).
In the double-path experiment, the transmitter cable is connected to a RF splitter 
with two outputs, one connected to a short cable (1.5m), and another to a long cable 
(25.9m). We first measure the CIR using a vector network analyzer, from which we 
find that the difference in delay between the two paths is 122 ns. The amplitude 
difference between the two paths is measured to be 9.5 dB by using a LadyBug power 
sensor (LB479A). Figure 2.6-(a) shows the CIR measurements for h2(t). As can
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be seen, h2(t) is consistently higher in amplitude than R s(t) between the samples 6 
through 10, indicative of later-arriving multipath power. The deconvolution algorithm 
of (2.11) is applied and the resulting estimate shown in Figure 2.6-(c).
The results clearly show two paths, the later paths with a 125 ns relative delay and 
between 10 and 12 dB less received power. In the results where the estimated power of 
the second path is above -20 dB relative to the path with maximum power (the same 
noise level we use for the calculation of the dispersion statistics), we find we are able 
to achieve a standard deviation of 0.69 radians for the difference in phase between 
multipath components corresponding to the first and second paths. Additionally, 
the standard deviation of the relative power of the two multipath components is 3.5 
dB. These statistics are good considering the hardware synchronization issues, phase 
noise, and the coarse sampling period for the CIR estimates.
Observation of Figures 2.6(b) and 2.6(c), as well as many other deconvolution 
results lead us to the conclusion that the dynamic range for the CIR measurement 
system is at least 20 dB, which is expected since the PN coding gain of the Barker 
code is 20log10 11 «  20.8 dB.
2.5.3 D rive-T est C IR  M easurem en t C am paign
We use our system to measure CIRs in three residential, two commercial, and 
one downtown area in Salt Lake City. The residential areas are comprised of one 
to three story single-family homes and apartment buildings. The commercial areas 
include streets near strip malls, low-rise office buildings, and heavy vehicle traffic. 
The downtown area is an urban canyon of high-rise office buildings on both sides of 
the streets. In each area, the receiver antenna is on the outside of a vehicle that 
drives at typical speeds on city streets. In the course of six five-minute drive-test 
measurements, a total of three million CIR measurements are recorded. Figure 2.7 
presents a typical deconvolved CIR estimates a  from each area.
In order to compare different multipath channels and to develop some general 
design guidelines for wireless systems, parameters that grossly quantify the multipath 
channel are used. The time dispersive properties of wide band multipath channels 
are most commonly quantified by their mean excess delay f  and RMS delay spread 
ar , as defined in [47]. Table 2.2 presents the average mean excess delay, average RMS
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delay spread, and maximum RMS delay spread of the measured channel responses 
for each area.
Delay spreads depend strongly on path length, antenna height, frequency, and 
environment. However, previous work has shown that, in general, rural and suburban 
delay spreads are smaller than in urban or dense urban areas [48-51]. Our results 
in Table 2.2 show a similar trend, since the residential and commercial areas can 
be considered suburban and have lower average RMS delay spreads than the urban 
downtown area. One of the few studies of RMS delay spreads for indoor-to-outdoor 
channels near 2.4 GHz reported average RMS delay spreads of 27-44 ns [52], but the 
studied path lengths were about 330 m, significantly longer than one would expect 
from 802.11b path lengths.
2.6 Conclusion
Future wireless networks are envisioned that rely on the real-time estimation of 
CIR from received WiFi packets for the purposes of cross-layer security, localization, 
and environmental imaging. We present a CIR estimation system using an inexpensive 
and open source hardware and software platform to enable these emerging areas of 
research. We show how accurate CIR estimation can be performed using a resource- 
constrained FPGA, which provides a proof-of-concept for future commercial devices.
Future work should address MIMO (e.g., 802.11n) CIR measurement using a bank 
of synchronized software radios. Low complexity MIMO CIR measurement will likely 




F igure 2.1. Correlation output signal q(t) in one-path channel (L = 1  and a 0 =  1) 
when (top) receiving an unmodulated signal (i.e., b  =  [1, 1, 1, 1, 1]); (bottom) 
receiving a signal modulated with b  =  [1, 1, —1, 1, 1].
F igure 2.2. Normalized symbol-period length correlation functions (left) Rs(t) and 
(right) Ro(t), both given in (2.8).
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F igure 2.3. Block diagram of FPGA matched filtering method.
Time
F igure 2.4. Samples (•) of PN code signal c(t), or equivalently, taps of the matched 
filter.
Table 2.1. Indices by group g and the group’s multiplier value cg.
g Multiplier cg Index Set Sg
1 19 {16,28}
2 18 {3, 7, 23, 24, 31}
3 17 {11,12,19, 22,15}
4 16 {25}
5 15 { 6}
6 14 { 8, 20, 22}
7 13 {4 ,1 3 }
8 12 {5 ,14 ,17 }
9 11 {29}
10 10 { 10}
11 8 {0 ,26 ,27 }
12 7 {1 ,3 0 }
13 4 {18}
14 2 {9 }


















F igure 2.5. Memories mem and bmem are used to accept a new sample, and shift 









F igure 2.6. Single- and double-path results: (a) h for single-path (upper figure) and
double-path (lower figure), both showing ideal CIR R s[n] (------- ); Deconvolved a  for















F igure 2.7. Typical CIR, a ,  measured in (a) residential, (b) commercial, and (c) 
downtown areas.
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Table 2.2. RMS delay spread and mean excess delay statistics for residential (Res.), 
commercial (Com.), and Downtown (DT) areas.
Res. 1 Res. 2 Res. 3 Com. 1 Com. 2 DT
Average f  (ns) 7.1 36.7 7.4 6.4 17.7 48.2
Average aT (ns) 7.0 23.7 7.4 6.5 16.9 30.6
Max. aT (ns) 47.4 86.8 35.2 22.8 80.7 88.6
CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENTAL PERFORMANCE 




A radio channel-based location distinction system monitors physical layer mea­
surements of received signals to detect if a transmitter has changed position since 
its previous transmission. This paper explores the design space for MIMO-based 
location distinction systems. Using extensive channel measurements collected with 
two different MIMO testbeds, we make several observations about the tradeoffs 
inherent in MIMO location distinction, and the scaling of performance with respect 
to bandwidth, history size and insertion delay, and number of antenna elements. We 
show that MIMO location distinction is very reliable. For example, a 2x2 MIMO 
channel with a bandwidth of 80 MHz allows a 64-fold reduction in miss rate over the 
single-input single-output (SISO) channel for a fixed false alarm rate, achieving false 
alarm rates as low as 4 x 10-4 for a 2.4 x 10-4 probability of missed detection.
3.2 Introduction
Location distinction is determining whether or not the position of a wireless 
device has changed. Detecting a change in position is fundamentally different from
1©[2012j. Reprinted, with permission, from D. Maas, N. Patwari, S.K. Kasera, D. Wasden, and 
M. Jensen, “Experimental Performance Evaluation of Location Distinction for MIMO Links,” in 
Proc. 4th IEEE International Conference on Communication Systems and Networks (COMSNETS), 
2012.
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estimating position (localization). In fact, location distinction can be performed 
without performing the more costly task of localizing wireless devices.
The ability to perform location distinction provides several benefits. These include 
an improved capability to monitor the positions of radio-tagged objects, better energy 
conservation in radio localization systems (by localizing only when devices have 
changed position), and a means to perform position-based authentication in wireless 
networks [14,15,53,54]. Existing work has shown that characteristics of the physical 
layer of wireless networks, including received signal strength (RSS), channel impulse 
response (CIR), or channel frequency response can be exploited to detect changes in 
transmitter or receiver positions [6,7,55,56].
Multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)-capable devices represent the state-of- 
the-art in wireless networking and have enabled significantly improved spectral effi­
ciencies in wireless networks. Many new wireless standards, such as 802.11n, WiMax, 
and 4G cellular, take advantage of MIMO technology. Therefore, it is very impor­
tant to evaluate location distinction for MIMO networks. However, to the authors’ 
knowledge, no extensive implementation or experimental evaluation of MIMO-based 
location distinction has been performed2.
Intuitively, we expect that location distinction performance should increase with 
the transition from SISO to MIMO, because the higher number of channels leads to a 
richer link measurement. However, the rate at which location distinction performance 
scales with system parameters including the number of antennas, channel bandwidth, 
and others, remains to be seen. In this paper, we evaluate location distinction for 
MIMO links under varying system parameters in order to understand the benefits 
and limits of MIMO location distinction performance, as well as how system design 
choices contribute to this performance. Specifically, we explore the use of band-limited 
estimates of the CIR, called link signatures [6,14], for location distinction.
We limit our exploration to methods that do not rely on calibration or supervised 
training. A training-based approach would require prohibitively extensive measure­
ments because link signatures vary rapidly with position. Furthermore, changes in
2 We had presented a preliminary experimental study of location distinction in MIMO networks 
in a poster [17]. We significantly expand on our preliminary study in this paper.
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the environment, such as the rearrangement of scatterers, would render the training 
data useless, and require periodic retraining. Without training or calibration, a 
location distinction algorithm should be able to reliably detect changes in location, 
regardless of whether or not the transmitter or receiver was moving, by comparing the 
current link signature with the ones in a recent history of signature measurements. 
We present the following work in order to characterize the performance of temporal 
link-signature-based location distinction for MIMO links:
1. We perform extensive measurement experiments with two different experimental 
testbeds.
2. We evaluate spatially and temporally dense channel measurements in order to 
study the spatial evolution of link signatures.
3. We show how to design a robust location distinction system and evaluate several 
trade-offs between system design choices and performance, including: link sig­
nature history size and insertion delay, bandwidth, complex vs. magnitude-only 
signatures, and number of antenna elements.
Our experimental evaluation leads to a better understanding of the benefits and 
limits of location distinction performance, as well as a general guide for system design. 
We show that:
1. Measured link signatures should not immediately be inserted into the history. 
Instead, for robust detection, the insertion of measurements should be delayed.
2. The number of link signatures to store in the history depends on the amount of 
temporal variation in the link signatures when the wireless device is stationary. 
Channels with less temporal variation require smaller histories, while those with 
more temporal variation require larger histories.
3. We observe, based on empirical data, that the miss rate for a constant false 
alarm rate follows an inverse power law with the number of antennas, i.e., the 
miss rate decreases slowly for large numbers of antennas. However, we see very 
dramatic improvements when comparing SISO to 2x 2 or 1x4 MIM O/SIMO
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location distinction systems, which is advantageous for MIMO systems with 
few antennas.
4. When random phase shifts due to imperfect synchronization are removed, link 
signatures with phase information lead to better performance than magnitude- 
only link signatures.
5. Increasing the bandwidth of the link signatures offers diminishing returns after 
about 20 MHz. In fact, higher bandwidth measurements are more susceptible 
to synchronization errors.
Our empirical data also show that MIMO location distinction performs well in a 
variety of experimental conditions. For example, we achieve a 4 x 10-4 probability 
of false alarm for a 2.4 x 10-4 probability of missed detection using a 2x2 MIMO 
channel with a bandwidth of 80 MHz, and a 3 x 10-4 probability of missed detection 
for a false alarm rate of 0.01 using a 1x2 SIMO channel with a bandwidth of 20 MHz.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.3, we describe the 
link signatures, metrics, and MIMO location distinction algorithm. In Section 3.4, 
we discuss two measurement experiments, which we will refer to as Experiment I and 
Experiment II. In Section 3.5, we present testing results and analysis of the MIMO 
location distinction algorithm. We discuss related work in Section 3.6. Conclusions 
and future work are presented in Section 3.7.
3.3 Methods
In this section, we first describe the wireless measurements, a.k.a. link signatures, 
we use for location distinction and the difference metrics we use to quantify changes 
in them. Next, we present a real-time location distinction algorithm. Please note 
that our definitions and methods described below for MIMO are similar to those we 
have used in our past work on SISO links [6,14].
3.3.1 Link Signatures
We define the complex temporal link signature (CTLS) calculated for the cth 
transmitter/receiver antenna pair as
fc =  [hc(0 )A (1 T s ) , . . . ,  hc( (M -  1)Ts)] (3.1)
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where hc ( t ) is the band-limited channel impulse response as a function of delay t  , M  
is the number of samples, Ts is the sampling period, and c E S , where
S =  {1 ,...,k 1 } x {1 ,...,k 2 }. (3.2)
The number of transmitter and receiver antennas are represented by k1 and k2, 
respectively. We also define the temporal link signature (TLS) calculated for the 
cth transmitter/receiver antenna pair as
gc =  [|hc(0)|. |hc(1Ts)|. . . ,  |hc((M  -  1)Ts)|]. (3.3)
The MIMO channel measurements used in this paper are gathered using either a 
multitone probe or preamble-based channel estimation, both of which are described 
in Section 3.4. In both cases, time-domain representations of the channel response 
are used for link signatures.
We let the MIMO complex temporal link signature (MIMO CTLS) be the con­
catenation of the set of complex temporal link signatures measured between the first 
k1 x k2 transmitter and receiver antennas:
F = [ f c , . . . . .  fck ], (3.4)
where c1; ck is a list of the elements of S .
Finally, we let the MIMO temporal link signature (MIMO TLS) be the concate­
nation of the set of temporal link signatures measured between the first k1 x k2 
transmitter and receiver antennas:
G  =  [gCl. . . . .  gCfc ]. (3.5)
3.3.2 D ifference M etric
In this section, we define the metric for measuring the difference between the 
current MIMO link signature and the history of previous MIMO link signatures. The 
history H is a first-in first-out (FIFO) buffer that stores a set of N  previous MIMO 
link signatures.
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The difference metric we explore in this paper is
A (F , H) =  — min IIF -  FII (3.6)o feu
where F is the current MIMO link signature and o is the average distance between 
link signatures in the history, defined as
0 (N -  1)(N -  2) ^  |Fl ^  (3.7)v ! Fi,F2GU
The magnitude-only TLS uses the t 2 norm in (3.6) and (3.7); for the CTLS, these 
norms are the 0 2 norm, defined as
||X -  Y|U =  min ||X -  Y e j0 ||,2 =  ||X||2 +  ||Y||2 -  2||X*Y||. (3.8)
The 02 norm removes the effect of random phase shifts that occur between subsequent 
CTLS measurements [6].
3.3.3 R eal-tim e Location D istinction
We evaluate a location distinction algorithm that operates in real-time without 
training. In such algorithms, recently recorded link signatures are stored in a “his­
tory” and compared to the most recent link signature. Specifically, we evaluate the 
following algorithm:
1. Measure the current link signature.
2. Calculate the difference metric A  from (3.6) between the current link signature 
and the link signatures in the FIFO history H.
3. Compare the difference A  to a threshold 7 . If A  > 7 , raise an alarm to indicate 
that the receiver has moved since the last link signature was measured. If A  < Y, 
do not raise an alarm, thereby indicating that the receiver has not moved since 
the last link signature was measured.
4. Add the current link signature to a delay buffer and add any link signature in 
the delay buffer older than D to the FIFO history H, where D E R is a time 
delay.
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5. Return to step 1.
We evaluate the performance of this algorithm for various thresholds 7  in order to 
identify system tradeoffs and characterize achievable system performance.
3.4 Measurements
We describe two MIMO measurement experiments. One is performed at Brigham 
Young University [57], and another is performed at the University of Utah. These ex­
periments provide an opportunity to examine the following two use cases for location 
distinction:
1. A wireless device sends packets while in motion so that each new packet is sent 
from a distinct location. In this case, the location distinction algorithm should 
detect the change with every new packet. Our Experiment I provides MIMO 
data to test the performance of location distinction in this use case.
2. A wireless device sends packets while stationary for a long period of time. Then, 
a new packet is sent from a distinct location, either because the wireless device 
has moved, or because a second wireless device is attempting to impersonate 
the first from a different location. In either case, the location distinction 
algorithm should detect the change with the final transmission. Our Experiment
II provides MIMO data to test the performance of location distinction for this 
use case.
Under both use cases, in order to simulate MIMO antenna arrays of different 
sizes and examine the associated performance of temporal signature-based location 
distinction, we compile the MIMO link signatures, as in (3.4) and (3.5), from the 
subsets of the SISO link signatures, CTLS and TLS, measured with 1 x k and k x k 
antenna arrays, where k G { 1 , . . . ,  8}. In both of these experiments, the receivers 
change position and the transmitters are stationary, but the reciprocity of the radio 
channel allows us to operate as if the opposite were true.
3.4.1 Experim ent I
In the first experiment, conducted at Brigham Young University by Wallace et 
al. [57], MIMO channel data are collected using an 8x8 MIMO channel sounder in
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which a multitone baseband signal is mixed with a carrier frequency of 2.55 GHz and 
transmitted to stationary and moving receivers. The transmitter is stationary for 
these measurements. The multitone signal is 80 MHz wide.
Channel measurements are collected at eight different receiver locations on a single 
floor of an office building. Figure 3.1 is a diagram showing the first three receiver 
locations. The circled numbers represent each location.
In the cases where the receiver is moving, it moves with a speed of 31.75 cm/sec. 
Note that this speed is about 0.7 miles per hour or 1.1 km per hour, which corresponds 
to a relatively slow walking speed. At each receiver location, between 390 and 585 
measurements are made, depending on the space available for receiver motion. In the 
measurements made with a moving receiver, the multitone probe is sent every 3.2 ms, 
or given the receiver speed of 31.75 cm/sec, every 1.016 mm. These spatially dense 
measurements are the reason we delay (D) inserting the most recently measured 
link signature into the history H. As we show in Section 3.5, the performance of 
location distinction improves when this delay is increased, or equivalently, when the 
current location of the receiver is further from the location it occupied during the 
measurements in the history H.
3.4.2 Experim ent II
The second experiment is performed at the University of Utah. Channel measure­
ments are made at a center frequency of 2.42 GHz using a MIMO-OFDM transceiver 
implemented with a National Instruments vector signal generator (VSG) and vector 
signal analyzer (VSA) and Labview software.
The transmitted signal is designed to emulate the IEEE 802.11n standard [58]. It 
is an OFDM signal and has 64 subcarriers contained in a total bandwidth of 20 MHz 
(312.5 kHz per subcarrier). The frame (timing) synchronization, carrier offset recov­
ery, and channel estimation are using the greenfield preamble described in the physical 
layer specification of the IEEE 802.11n standard, but we omit the high throughput 
signal field. This field is normally used to convey MAC information regarding the 
coding, modulation scheme, etc., and is not necessary for the channel estimation 
required by this experiment. Moose’s method is used for frame synchronization and 
carrier recovery [38,59].
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The MIMO channel state is estimated using mutually orthogonal sequences. A 
minimum mean-squared-error (MMSE) channel estimation algorithm with a structure 
derived from the MMSE estimator in [60] is employed, but we increase the number 
of transmit symbols used for estimating the channel from two symbols (for a 2x2 
system) to four symbols.
In order to ensure their accuracy, channel measurements are only recorded for 
packets with low bit error rate. Similarly, future location distinction implementations 
may ensure accurate channel measurements and improve system performance by only 
recording measurements made on correctly decoded packets, thereby avoiding the 
effects of interference from other transmitters.
The data are collected in the Wireless Communication Lab at the University of 
Utah, an open plan office lab containing desks, bookcases, chairs, and measurement 
equipment. We take measurements at eighteen different receiver locations and four 
different transmitter locations, as shown in Figure 3.2, resulting in a total of 3600 
measurements of 72 distinct radio links.
3.5 Results and Discussion
In order to evaluate the performance of our location distinction algorithm, we 
define the outputs of the difference metric (3.6) for the MIMO CTLS and MIMO 
TLS as
E f =  A (F , H)
and
Eg =  A (G , H),
respectively. These values are recorded under experimental conditions corresponding 
to the following null and alternate hypotheses:
H0 : The receiver has not changed position.
H1 : The receiver has changed position.
This allows us to frame location distinction as a standard threshold-based detection 
problem, as discussed in [61], and produce receiver operating characteristic (ROC) 
curves which quantify the tradeoff between false alarm PFA and detection PD rates
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under various thresholds 7 . The PFA and PD as a function of 7  allow us to evaluate 
how well location distinction would have worked if a threshold of 7  was used in the 
real-time algorithm. Thus the set of possible Pf a /Pd combinations provide a curve 
of feasible real-time detection performance.
In this section, we present and discuss these results in the context of four link 
signature characteristics: spatial distance between link signature measurements, the 
size of the history H, the number of antennas in the MIMO array, and link signature 
bandwidth.
3.5.1 Spatial D istance /  Delay
The results of both experiments show that differences in spatial location between 
link signatures are more significant than the temporal variations in link signatures 
measured for stationary receivers. In other words, changing the position of the 
transmitter/receiver has a more significant effect on the measured link signatures 
than moving scatterers. Figure 3.3 shows the magnitudes of the 1x1 TLS measured 
at a stationary or moving receiver in Experiment I. The variation of the signatures 
for the moving receiver is more significant. In the case of the MIMO TLS, the same 
effect can be seen in the empirical distributions of the difference metric (3.6). These 
distributions are shown in Figure 3.4(a). The mean difference metric is much higher 
in the case of a moving receiver. The same result can be seen in the empirical dis­
tributions of the difference metrics calculated for Experiment II. These distributions 
are shown in Figure 3.4(b).
Figure 3.5(a) shows the average i 2 and 02 distances between 8x8 MIMO CTLSs as 
a function of receiver separation where the 02 distance is defined in (3.8). The average 
£2-distance reaches a maximum at a separation of approximately A/2 ( «  12.5 cm for 
our testbeds), and then oscillates with a period of A. This result agrees with a result of 
the Clarke fading model, which assumes incoming multipath are uniformly distributed 
about the receiver [47]. The average 02-distance peaks at a receiver separation of 
about A and the oscillation is mitigated by the phase rotation inherent in the 02- 
distance. Figure 3.5(b) shows the average difference metrics E , calculated according 
to (3.7), as a function of receiver separation. These results indicate that the difference 
metrics perform best in the case where the receiver has moved about a half-wavelength
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between measurements. We note that for the detection of impersonation attacks it is 
very reasonable to assume that the attacker’s antennas are more than A/2 away from 
the antennas of the device being impersonated.
Under use case #1, the spatial distance between the signatures in the history and 
the most recent signature is determined by the delay D. Choosing D to be larger 
than the coherence time of the channel ensures that the signatures will offer sufficient 
decorrelation. If D is less than the coherence time of the channel, missed detections 
will increase. A simple approach to decide on an appropriate value for D is to use 
the tighter estimate suggested in [47] for estimating 50% coherence time Tc:
9
Tc =  1 6 f  (3-9)
where f  is the maximum Doppler shift, which is proportional to the velocity of the 
moving transceiver. This Doppler shift can be estimated using one of the methods 
reviewed in [62], or it can be computed using the lowest transceiver velocity to be 
detected. We note that the delay improves performance under use case #1, but has 
no effect under use case # 2.
The average maximum Doppler for a moving receiver in Experiment I is approx­
imately 5 Hz [57]. Using (3.9), this yields a coherence time of approximately 85 ms. 
In our analysis we examined delays of 32, 64, 96, and 128 ms. While performance 
improves with delay, it stabilizes for D > Tc. An example of this can be seen in 
Figure 3.6, which presents the false alarm rates vs. D for PM =  1 x 10-4  using 
the 8x8 MIMO TLS, where is the probability of a missed detection. We note that 
this corresponds to approximately a quarter of a wavelength, suggesting that (3.9) 
leads to a smaller than ideal delay, but the performance gain associated with larger 
D is minimal.
3.5.2 H istory Size
The optimal number of signatures to include in the history depends on the distri­
butions of the differences measured under H0 and H1. We examine a range of history 
sizes in both experiments in order to understand how this parameter affects location 
distinction performance. Because of the minimum operator in (3.6), increasing the 
history size can only lower the average difference metric, E , under both hypotheses.
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This has the effect of decreasing false alarms at the expense of an increase in missed 
detections.
Figure 3.7(a) shows the ROC curve of the location distinction algorithm for 
the 8x8 MIMO CTLS of Experiment I and various history sizes. In this case, the 
best performance corresponds to a history containing fifteen previous link signatures. 
Figure 3.7(b) shows the ROC curve of the location distinction algorithm for the 2x2 
CTLS of Experiment II and various history sizes. In this case, a history size of five 
offers the best performance. The difference in optimal history size can be understood 
in terms of the marginal distributions from Figure 3.4.
The difference metrics E f measured under H0 in Experiment I have a significantly 
higher mean and variance than those measured under the same hypothesis in Exper­
iment II, indicating that the temporal variations of the link signatures measured for 
a stationary receiver in Experiment I are more prominent than those in Experiment
II. Therefore, a larger history size is necessary in Experiment I in order to capture 
the temporal variations of the stationary receiver. In general, the history size should 
increase with the temporal variations in the channel and/or system noise. Future 
work should investigate adaptively setting the history size based on current channel 
conditions.
3.5.3 N um ber o f  Antennas
The results show that as the size of the MIMO antenna array is increased, the 
performance of the location distinction algorithm improves. This is consistent with 
the simulation results of [7], which use a ray-tracing simulation to show that the 
average miss rate in a location distinction system decreases with the number of 
antenna elements.
Figure 3.8 shows the location distinction ROC curves for the data from Experiment
I and MIMO antenna arrays with k\ transmit antennas and k2 receive antennas for 
various combinations of k\ and k2. Figure 3.9 shows the ROC curves for the same 
experiment, but using SIMO arrangements. The trend in these figures is toward better 
location distinction performance with the increase in size of the MIMO antenna array. 
Figure 3.10 shows the achievable miss rates for a false alarm rate of 2 x 10-3  for various 




Pm =  (klkO™ (3.10)
where b and m are parameters that define the rate that the probability of missed 
detection approaches zero with the number of channels. A least-squares approxi­
mation yields b 10 1'44 and m 0.93 for the data in Figure 3.10. As a rule 
of thumb, the achievable miss rate for a constant false alarm rate is approximately 
inversely proportional to k1 k2, the number of channels. In general, the power law 
relationship for Pm is not as conducive to rapid decrease in Pm as an exponential 
decrease would be, for example. If the relationship holds for k1k2 > 64, then it would 
require significant increases in the number of antennas to further reduce Pm .
However, we note that the miss rate shows dramatic improvement for k1k2 =  4 
(2x2 or 1x4), compared to 1x1, MIMO systems. Table 3.1 shows the improvement of 
the location distinction algorithm in a 2x2 MIMO channel over the SISO channel in 
Experiment I. There is as much as a 108-fold reduction in the miss rate for a constant 
false alarm rate when changing from SISO to 2x2 MIMO.
3.5.4 M IM O  CTLS and TLS
In comparing Figures 3.8(a) and 3.8(b), it is also apparent that the MIMO CTLS 
and its associated difference metric leads to better performance than the MIMO 
TLS in Experiment I. Table 3.1 shows the improvement of the location distinction 
algorithm when using the MIMO CTLS instead of the MIMO TLS. Using the MIMO 
CTLS results in as much as a 133-fold reduction in miss rate for a constant false 
alarm rate.
This result is also confirmed in Experiment II, as shown in Table 3.1. In Exper­
iment II, the 1x1 CTLS results in a 3.5-fold improvement in miss rate over the 1x1 
TLS. The 2x2 TLS and 2x2 CTLS both reach the lowest measurable miss rate in 
Experiment II.
3.5.5 Link Signature Bandw idth
Another crucial parameter in both experiments, and typically a limiting factor 
in radio design, is system bandwidth. We examine the performance of the location
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distinction algorithm over a range of bandwidths by varying the number of tones 
included in the frequency-domain measurements from Experiment I.
Figure 3.11 shows that performance typically improves with bandwidth, but it 
does so with diminishing returns. This is consistent with the simulation results of [7], 
which show that the miss rate of a location distinction system decreases with system 
bandwidth, but that the performance gain of MIMO over SISO also decreases, because 
at high bandwidths the SISO link signatures offer sufficient decorrelation.
However, at high bandwidths the algorithm is more sensitive to timing-synchronization 
errors that might be hidden by lower bandwidth signatures. Figure 3.12 shows 
an example of two consecutively measured link signatures that exhibit this effect. 
These errors cause small drops in performance. The higher bandwidth of the link 
signatures measured in Experiment I (80 MHz) allows for better location distinction 
performance, but the results for the 2x2 MIMO link signatures of Experiment II (20 
MHz) still offer a 3 x 10-4  probability of missed detection for a 7 x 10-3 probability 
of false alarm.
3.6 Related Work
The papers discussed in this section have contributed to this work in different 
aspects. The most closely related work is presented in [14] and [6]. In these two 
papers, a temporal link signature is defined to be used in the context of multiple 
transmitters/receivers and then refined to include phase information. We compliment 
that work by showing that a single MIMO transmitter/receiver pair can be used to 
perform reliable location distinction, and that lower false alarm rates are possible 
using a single receiver, when the communication system is a 1x2 or 2x2 MIMO system.
In [6], the authors report a 9 x 10-3  miss rate for a 0.01 false alarm rate using three 
receivers. For the same false alarm rate, we are able to achieve a 3 x 10-4  miss 
rate using a single receiver and the 2x2 MIMO CTLS with less bandwidth. This 
net reduction in system complexity may enable location distinction in future wireless 
networking systems.
In [6], a complex temporal link signature is defined which allows for the exploitation 
of the phase information in the CIR. However, not all of the phase information
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represented by the link signature is due to the channel. Some phase shifts occur 
due to a lack of time and/or frequency synchronization between the transmitter and 
receiver. The distance between two link signatures which minimizes the contribution 
of random phase shifts is shown to be (3.8); [6] calls this the 02-distance.
In [7], ray-tracing simulation results for MIMO location distinction in defense of 
impersonation attacks in an office building are presented. The authors assume that 
channel measurements made in the frequency domain are distributed as complex 
Gaussian random variables and derive ideal change metrics based on this assump­
tion. We extend this work by offering an experimental validation of MIMO location 
distinction using two MIMO testbeds.
In [56], the authors propose some of the underlying ideas of this work, namely, that 
characteristics of the radio channel (rapid decorrelation in space, time, and frequency) 
can be exploited to secure wireless networks. They offer methods of probing the 
channel in order to determine, based on the channel gains between transmitters and 
receivers, whether or not communications are coming from an authentic user or a 
would-be attacker. Using the USRP/GNU Radio and a simple change-point detector, 
they show that they are able to detect a change in the wireless link via channel gains 
and thereby detect a possible spoofing attack.
In [55], the authors utilize similar principles in designing a method for identifying 
a transmitter by its signalprint, which consists of a vector of RSS values. These 
RSS values are gathered using wireless access points as sensors and a central authen­
tication server for cataloging and comparing signalprints. Their results show that 
a stationary transmitter will produce a consistent signalprint and thereby allow for 
discrimination between authentic users and attackers whose signalprints will vary 
significantly because they are located in a different position in the multipath fading 
channel. The signalprint is limited in that it may be unable to detect attackers located 
near authentic transmitters, because they may have similar signalprints.
Much of the discussed work has suggested using channel measurements gathered 
at multiple receivers in order to perform location distinction [6,14,54,55,63]. However, 
in typical WiFi networks, adjacent access points are set to operate on different 
channels in order to reduce interference and clients operate on a single channel. This
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makes collecting channel data at multiple access points difficult. Extending location 
distinction to MIMO allows robust location distinction to be performed with a single 
receiver.
3.7 Conclusion and Future Work
In order to design a reliable MIMO location distinction system with limited 
resources, a system designer should understand in what aspects increasing system 
complexity will lead to better system performance. We present an extensive ex­
perimental evaluation of MIMO location distinction using two experimental test 
beds. The results show that there are diminishing returns for certain aspects of 
system design. Increasing the number of antennas offers diminishing returns after 1x4 
SIMO or 2x2 MIMO, which favors MIMO systems with a small number of antennas. 
Increasing system bandwidths beyond 20 MHz offers diminishing returns as well, 
partially because lower bandwidths tend to mask the effects of timing synchronization 
errors on link signatures. However, the experiments show that MIMO location 
distinction performs very well with just a single receiver. We detail performance 
tradeoffs regarding the size of the history for optimal performance. This combined 
knowledge will benefit anyone seeking to implement a location distinction algorithm.
In the future, it will be beneficial to further characterize the link signatures used 
for location distinction and explore other difference metrics. For instance, our current 
difference metric uses the minimum Euclidean or 02-distance between the most recent 
link signature and those in the history H. This tends to increase the miss rate in 
the context of noisy measurements. A weighted average of distances, such as the 
Mahalanobis distance, may offer better performance. A broader experimental analysis 
of link signatures and their temporal and spatial variations will facilitate the design 
of better difference metrics.
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Figure 3.1. Diagram of a subset of receiver locations from Experiment I. Circled 
numbers represent the receiver locations for individual measurement sets. DO or DC 
indicate door open or door closed, respectively.
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Figure 3.2. Diagram of Experiment II. Circles represent receiver locations, diamonds 
represent transmitter locations. The outer line represents the wall of the room. Chan­
nel measurements are made at each transmitter/receiver location. Desks, equipment, 















Figure 3.3. Link signatures measured (a) over time at a stationary receiver and (b) 
at a moving receiver. The signatures measured at a moving receiver fluctuate more 
than those measured at the stationary receiver.
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Figure 3.4. Empirical distributions of Ef for stationary and moving receiver from
(a) Experiment I with 8x8 CTLS, and (b) Experiment II with the 2x2 CTLS. In both 





















Spatial distance between link signatures (X)
(a)
Spatial distance between signature and history (A)
(b)
Figure 3.5. (a) Average £2 and 02-distances between 8x8 MIMO CTLS as a function 
of spacial separation. The average £2-distance peaks at a receiver separation of roughly 




Figure 3.6. Probability of false alarm vs. delay D for a miss rate of 1 x 10-4  for 
the 8x8 MIMO TLS. Performance gain stabilizes for delays larger than 85 ms, the 
coherence time of the channel.
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Probability of False Alarm
(a)
Probability of False Alarm
(b)
Figure 3.7. ROC curves for (a) Experiment I: 8x8 MIMO CTLS and (b) Experiment 
II: 1x1 CTLS for various history sizes. In Experiment I, a history size of fifteen link 
signatures yields the best performance. In Experiment II, a history size of five link 
signatures yields the best performance.
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Probability of False Alarm
(a)
Probability of False Alarm
(b)
Figure 3.8. ROC curves for (a) MIMO TLS and (b) MIMO CTLS for various 
antenna array sizes. Location distinction performance improves with the number of 
antennas and the MIMO CTLS performs better than the MIMO TLS.
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Probability of False Alarm
(a)
Probability of False Alarm
(b)
Figure 3.9. ROC curves for (a) SIMO TLS and (b) SIMO CTLS for various antenna 
array sizes. Location distinction performance improves with the number of antennas 
and the SIMO CTLS performs better than the SIMO TLS. The SIMO signatures 











Figure 3.10. Experiment I: Probability of missed detection for a 2 x 10 3 probability 
of false alarm vs. for different SISO, MIMO, and SIMO arrays.
Table 3.1. Pm for PFa =  10 2 for Experiments I and II.
Experiment I Experiment II
(kj,k2) MIMO TLS MIMO CTLS CTLS/TLS MIMO TLS MIMO CTLS CTLS/TLS
Pm Pm Improvement Pm Pm Improvement
(1.1) 0.032 <  0.00024 > 133x 0.0323 0.0092 «  3.5x
(2.2) 0.0005 < 0.00024 > 2x < 0.0003 < 0.0003 N /A
MIMO Improvement «  64x N /A > 108x > 31x
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Link Signature Bandwidth (MHz)
Figure 3.11. Location distinction miss rate vs. link signature bandwidth for a 








^  2 
_ c




Figure 3.12. Two consecutive link signatures with 80 MHz bandwidth showing the 
results of a timing-synchronization error. The time-resolution of high-bandwidth link 








We introduce and investigate the ability of an attacker to surreptitiously use 
an otherwise secure wireless network to detect moving people through walls, in an 
area in which people expect their location to be private. We call this attack on 
location privacy of people an “exploiting radio windows” (ERW) attack. We design 
and implement the ERW attack methodology for obtaining through wall people 
location information that relies on reliably detecting when people cross the link lines 
by using physical layer measurements between the legitimate transmitters and the 
attack receivers. We also develop a method to estimate the direction of movement 
of a person from the sequence of link lines crossed during a short time interval. 
Additionally, we describe how an attacker may estimate any artificial changes in 
transmit power (used as a countermeasure), compensate for these power changes 
using measurements from sufficient number of links, and still detect line crossings. We 
implement our methodology on WiFi and ZigBee nodes and experimentally evaluate 
the ERW attack by monitoring people movements through walls in two real-world 
settings. We find that our methods achieve very high accuracy in detecting line 
crossings and determining direction of motion.
1©[2013j. Submitted to IEEE Transactions on Networking as A. Banerjee, D. Maas, M. Bocca, 




We investigate an attack on the privacy of the location of people moving in an 
area covered by a wireless network. People moving in an area covered by one or 
more wireless networks affect the way radio signals propagate. We demonstrate 
that the presence, location and direction of movement of people not carrying any 
wireless device can be “eavesdropped” by using the channel information of wireless 
links artificially created by an attacker by deploying sensing devices or receivers that 
can “hear” transmitters such as WiFi access points (APs), composing the legitimate 
wireless network. Signals from the transmitters passing through nonmetal external 
walls that allow radio waves to go through, are analogous to light from light bulbs 
passing through glass windows which an adversary can use to “see” where people are 
in a building. Hence, we call this attack on location privacy of people an “exploiting 
radio windows” (ERW) attack.
Consider a building where security is important, e.g., an embassy, with a concrete 
exterior wall. One or more wireless networks may have been set up in this building 
to transfer different types of data, including voice and video. We can expect these 
networks to implement advanced data security protocols to prevent eavesdropping of 
data. However, an attacker can still deploy receivers outside the wall of the building 
to measure different parameters of the received radio signals. By measuring the 
channel state information (CSI) or received signal strength (RSS), for example, of 
the links from the transmitters inside the building to the receivers deployed, the 
attacker can monitor the movements of people and objects inside the building in the 
area behind the wall in Figure 4.1. The information about people’s movements can be 
put to malicious use including planning a physical attack on the personnel inside the 
building. On the contrary, law enforcement personnel can apply similar techniques in 
the case of a hostage situation to track activity inside a large building and plan their 
operation accordingly.
In this paper, we design and implement the ERW attack methodology for through 
wall people localization. Our methodology relies on reliably detecting when people 
cross the link lines between the legitimate transmitters and the attack receivers. We 
first develop a majority-vote based detection algorithm that reliably detects line of
60
sight (LOS) crossing between the legitimate transmitter and the attack receivers 
by comparing short-term variances in link channel information with its long-term 
counterpart. We also develop a method to estimate the direction of movement of a 
person from the sequence of link lines crossed during a short time interval. Next, we 
implement our methodology on WiFi and ZigBee nodes and experimentally evaluate 
the ERW attack by monitoring people movements through walls in two real-world 
settings —  a hallway of a university building separated from the outside by a 1 ft 
thick concrete wall, and a residential house. When we use two WiFi 802.11n nodes 
with normal antenna separation, or two groups of ZigBee nodes as attack receivers, 
we find that our methods achieve close to 100% accuracy in detecting line crossings 
and the direction of movement. We also find that our methods achieve 90 — 100% 
accuracy when we use a single 802.11n attack receiver.
To protect the privacy of the location information from the ERW attack, the 
owner of the legitimate network may choose to implement a countermeasure in which 
the transmitters vary their transmit power during successive transmissions. The 
artificial transmit power changes can be either random or follow a predefined profile 
replicating the typical channel variations introduced when a person crosses a link 
line. This countermeasure is expected to introduce additional variability in the 
received signal measured by the attack receivers and can be wrongly interpreted 
by the attacker as caused by moving people or objects crossing the link lines. In 
this paper, we demonstrate that an attacker who can measure a sufficient number 
of links can accurately estimate the artificial transmit power change, compensate 
for it, and ultimately locate people and monitor their movements. We base our 
compensation strategy on the following intuition: an artificial transmit power change 
at a transmitter will impact all the links between the transmitter and the attack 
receivers, whereas genuine power changes due to human movement are likely to impact 
only some of the links.
The ERW attack described in this paper is significantly different than device-free 
localization2 (DFL) in that the ERW attack is practical for large buildings, is stealthy
2 In which people who are not carrying any radio transmitters are located by a static deployed 
network.
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because no transmitters are deployed by the attacker, and is immune from jamming. 
DFL systems such as the ones in [9, 64-70] require dozens of radio transceivers 
deployed throughout or on many sides of the target area. Further, through-building 
DFL systems such as [70, 71] assume the transmitted signal penetrates through two 
external walls and any internal walls in between, and as such have been tested only 
in buildings of small (18 - 42 m2) size. In this paper, we show access to one side 
is sufficient for an ERW attack, and it requires a signal from inside a building to 
penetrate only one external wall. Other fingerprint-based DFL systems [12, 72-74] 
require collection of training data with a person in each possible location in the 
environment. In our ERW attack, we do not assume that an attacker has prior access 
to the inside of the building to be able to perform such data collection. Further, to 
perform DFL, an attacker must deploy some nodes which transmit, exposing them 
to being detected and located by RF source localization, while an ERW attack is 
stealthier in that purely passive receivers are deployed by an attacker. Finally, DFL 
systems’ signals could be interfered with by a powerful jammer. In the method in 
this paper, any transmitter in the building, including a jammer, could be used as a 
source for ERW.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.3, we describe 
the adversary model. In Section 4.4, we formulate the methods used to detect link 
line crossings and estimate changes in transmit power. We also describe the method 
used to determine the direction of motion of the person. The experimental setup is 
presented in Section 4.5. In Section 4.6, we present the results of our experiments. 
Section 4.7 discusses the previous research in the area of location privacy attacks in 
wireless networks. Conclusions and directions for future work are given in Section 
4.8.
4.3 Adversary Model
We make the following assumptions about the attacker3:
• The attacker is able to deploy multiple wireless sensing devices within the trans-
3In this paper, we use the term attacker for anyone, whether malicious or genuine, who is trying 
to localize humans.
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mission range of the legitimate transmitter(s) outside the area being monitored. 
The attacker is able to measure the physical layer information (RSS and/or CSI) 
of the links between the transmitter(s) and the attack receivers.
• The attacker does not have access to the content of the packets transmitted by 
the legitimate network nodes.
• The attacker does not deploy any transmitters, nor does he have any control over 
the legitimate transmitters. However, he requires the legitimate transmitters to 
transmit packets frequently enough to perform line crossing detections.
• The attacker does not make any assumption regarding the transmit power profile 
of the transmitters.
• The attacker nodes do not associate or interfere in any manner with the trans­
missions of the legitimate transmitter(s).
• The attacker may not know the precise location of the transmitters or the 
arrangement of their antennas. However, we do assume that a transmitter 
is located well inside the perimeters of buildings for network coverage reasons 
ensuring that they do not lie between the people (being localized) and the attack 
receivers.
4.4 Methodology
In this section, we first develop a methodology to detect line crossings based on 
a majority vote for WiFi 802.11n receivers. We also develop a method that uses a 
sequence of line crossings to determine the direction of human movement. Next, we 
present our approaches for estimating transmit power change and its compensation, 
when the transmit power is artificially changed by the owner of the wireless trans­
mitters, inside a secure building, with the hope of preserving location privacy. Last, 
we show how we adapt our methodology for IEEE 802.15.4 ZigBee attack receivers.
4.4.1 Line Crossing D etection
Many modern WiFi networks use the 802.11n standard, in which transceivers 
are equipped with multiple antennas in order to leverage the spatial diversity of
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the wireless channel. While these multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems 
provide high data rates, they also provide a rich source of channel information to an 
adversary interested in localizing people inside a building.
The 802.11n wireless standard uses the well-known orthogonal frequency-division 
multiplexing (OFDM) modulation scheme, which encodes and transmits data across 
multiple subcarriers for each transmitter-receiver antenna pair. When an 802.11n 
receiver receives a packet, it estimates the effect of the wireless channel on each 
MIMO OFDM subcarrier for the purpose of channel equalization. Since this channel 
state information (CSI), represented as a complex gain for each subcarrier, is mea­
sured during the unencrypted preamble of each WiFi packet, an adversary without 
legitimate access to data on the network can still measure the CSI for every packet.
We apply a windowed variance method for detecting abrupt changes in the CSI 
for a WiFi link. Let Hj,k (n) be the magnitude of the signal strength for the jth  
transmitter-receiver antenna pair and the kth OFDM subcarrier for the nth packet. 
We define the windowed variance measurement at packet n as follows. Let
1 n
j  ( " ) =  W E  Hj,k (i), (4.1)
i=n- w+1 
1 n
j ( n )  = -------1 J 2  (Hj,k(i) -  j ) 2, (4.2)w -  1 i=n-w+1
and
j (n) =  \jvlk (n) > (4.3) 
where, w is the number of previous CSI samples in the window. We define the 
subcarrier-average variance for packet n for a given antenna pair j  as
j  (n) =  -N E  j  (")• (4.4)
k
where N  is the number of subcarriers. We define the subcarrier-average standard 
deviation for packet n as
j ( n ) =  jN E  s"k(n). (4.5)
N k
The quantities (4.4) and (4.5) represent the average CSI variance and standard 
deviation across all subcarriers for antenna pair j  at packet n for a time window that
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includes the past w packets. We track both (4.4) and (4.5) over a short-term time 
window ws, and a long-term time window wi, allowing us to compare the short-term 
and long-term statistics of the WiFi link and detect line crossings.
A line crossing is detected for antenna pair j  when
^  V p  (n) -  V p  (n) > Y(n), (4.6)
neD
where D is the most recent contiguous set of packets for which V p  (n) — V p  (n) > 0 
and the threshold y(n) is defined as
Y (n) =  V/ 1 (n) +  CSw (n). (4.7)
The constant C is included to allow the user to adjust the trade-off between false 
alarms and missed detections.
In the case where there are more than two antenna pairs, we take the majority 
vote between antenna pairs over the short-term window to decide if a line crossing 
has occurred. More specifically, when a receiver antenna detects a line crossing, we 
count the line crossing detections for all the receiver antennas over the short-term 
window, ws. For a 3 x 3 MIMO transmitter and receiver, this would mean computing 
a majority vote over nine measurements. When the majority of the receiver antennas 
detect a line crossing within ws, we infer that a person has crossed the link line 
between the transmitter and the receiver. We will show that this majority vote 
method improves the performance of our detector by decreasing false alarms and 
missed detections. We decrease the false alarm rate further by combining temporally 
close detections together. More specifically, if we detect a line crossing at time t 1 for 
a transmitter-receiver pair using the majority vote, we do not consider any other line 
crossing detected in the time interval (ti,ti +  A] for the same transmitter-receiver 
pair, i.e., all line crossings detected in the interval [t1,t1 +  A] are considered as a 
single line crossing for a transmitter-receiver pair.
We note that our window-based variance method differs from the method pre­
sented in [72,75]. In [72,75], the authors compare recent window-based variance 
measurements of RSSI at multiple WiFi links to measurements made during a static 
calibration period when nobody is moving in the area of interest. If a certain number
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of WiFi links within the area of interest detect motion within a certain time interval, a 
motion event is detected in the area of interest. Our attacker does not know if and/or 
when people are moving inside of the building, and therefore cannot create calibration 
measurements based on a static environment. Instead, we compare a short-term 
window variance to a long-term windowed variance. The long-term window allows us 
to capture the behavior of the wireless links when the majority of measurements are 
likely made while there is nobody crossing the link line. Additionally, in the case of 
802.11n, we exploit the effect that line crossings have on each OFDM subcarrier and 
MIMO antenna pair.
4.4.2 Determ ining D irection o f  M otion
If the adversary measures the CSI at multiple receivers, or if a single receiver 
includes multiple antennas as is the case with 802.11n, it is also possible to infer the 
direction that a person is walking when line crossings are detected. The direction of 
motion is inferred from the time differences between the line crossing detections at 
each receiver, in the case of multiple receivers, or at each transmitter-receiver antenna 
pair, when the receivers include multiple antennas.
Consider the scenario where the attacker arranges the MIMO antenna array of an 
802.11n receiver such that the antennas are roughly parallel to a hallway as shown 
in Figure 4.2(a). The spatial order of the antennas with reference to the hallway 
is known, and each transmitter-receiver antenna is given an index according to its 
spatial order. Based on the adversary model assumption that a transmitter is located 
well inside the perimeter, the attacker, even without knowing the precise location of 
the transmitter or the arrangement of its antennas, may treat the antennas of the 
wireless transmitter as if they are colocated and still achieve reliable results.
In the single WiFi receiver case, if a link crossing is detected by majority vote for a 
given short-term window, we find the line that best fits the set of points {(dj ,n j ) : j  E 
P }, where dj is the spatial index of antenna pair j  representing its location relative 
to the other links, nj is the packet index indicating when a detection occurred at 
antenna pair j  according to (4.6), and P  is the set of antenna pairs ending at the 
WiFi receiver which detected a line crossing during the short-term window. The 
sign of the slope of this line indicates the direction of motion. Figure 4.2 shows an
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example which uses CSI measurements from three antennas at the WiFi transmitter 
and three antennas at WiFi RX1 (nine antenna pairs). In the case of two single-input 
single-output (SISO) WiFi receivers, a similar method may be applied, but the two 
spatial and packet indexes directly determine the line and its slope.
4.4.3 C om pensation o f  Transmit Power Change
In this subsection, we propose a methodology to detect artificial transmit power 
changes (if any) and compensate for the same. The signal strength for the jth  
transmitter-receiver antenna pair and the kth OFDM subcarrier for packet n is given 
by
(n) =  TX(n) +  Gt +  Gr — (n) +  (n), (4.8)
where Tx(n) is the transmit power of the transmitter at time n, Gt and Gr are the 
transmitter and receiver antenna gains, respectively, L jk(n) is the path loss, and 
(i) is a noise term. The path loss includes all environmentally-dependent terms, 
including large-scale loss, shadowing, and small-scale fading. The noise term includes 
thermal noise, quantization noise, and other measurement noise at the attacker re­
ceiver.
The attacker cannot depend on knowing the transmit power or antenna gains. 
Instead, the attacker relies on the difference between the subcarrier signal strength for 
the packet n and the reference packet (n =  0) (the attacker may update the reference 
packet periodically to account for changes in the environment). This difference in 
subcarrier signal strength is given by
hj-fc (n) =  (n) — j  (0). (4.9)
From (4.8), we see that
hj-fc (n) =  tx (n) — (n) +  j  (n), (4.10)
where
tx(n) =  Tx(n) — Tx(0),
Zj,fc(n) =  Lj,fc(n) — Lj,fc(0),
j  (n) =  j  (n) — j  (0).
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The subcarrier signal strength difference hj;k(n) above, contains transmit power changes 
and channel-induced changes between the nth packet and the reference packet, in 
addition to noise.
The ideal situation from the attacker’s perspective would be that there is no 
artificial change in transmit powers, and that tx (n) =  0 for all j  and k. In this ideal 
situation, the subcarrier signal strength difference below is solely due to changes in 
the channel.
hj,k (n) =  -lj,k  (n) +  j  (n). (4.11)
Furthermore, people crossing the line between the transmitter and receiver antennas 
typically cause a path loss change more significant than noise, and thus the hj,k signal 
allows direct inference of people’s motion. However, when the transmitter artificially 
changes its transmit power, from (4.10), we cannot directly attribute a large mag­
nitude of hj;k to environmental changes. In particular, if the magnitude of transmit 
power changes is high enough, the magnitude of hj;k (n) will be predominantly due 
to because of transmit power changes at the transmitter. A transmitter could thus 
presumably preserve location privacy by changing its transmit power frequently.
We now propose a method that a smart attacker can use to estimate and remove 
the artificial power changes and accurately detect line crossings. In our method, 
the attacker estimates the artificial transmit power change amplitude by correlating 
measurements across all antenna pairs and all subcarriers, and removes the effect of 
transmit power changes from the received signal strength measurements. We propose 
to use the median of hk)j- (n) for all available transmitter-receiver antenna pairs and 
corresponding subcarriers, as an estimator of the artificial transmit power change, as 
shown in the equation below:
ix(n) =  median {hj;k(n)Vj, k} . (4.12)
Our choice of this estimator is based on the following observations. First, we observe 
that tx(n) appears in the equation for hk)j-(n) for all j  and k. This is because, any 
change in transmit power affects measurements across all transmitter-receiver antenna 
pairs and corresponding subcarriers simultaneously. Moreover, tx(n) is linearly related 
to lj,k and hj,k. We also know that the change in the path loss lj,k is just as likely to
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be positive as negative. Furthermore, any change due to human movement will not 
affect all the links simultaneously.
In the absence of an artificial transmit power change, ix(n) is likely to be close 
to zero, i.e., our estimator does not require us to detect whether or not there is an 
artificial transmit power change for packet n.
The compensated signal strength for packet n, which we denote Hj,k(n), is given
by
Hj)fc (n) =  Hjtk (n) — 4  (n). (4.13)
Although the reference packet was sent with unknown transmit power Tx(0), for 
n > 0, we consider Tx(n) to be the relative dB shift in transmit power compared to 
Tx (0). Hj,k (n) essentially, is an estimate of the subcarrier signal strength if there were 
no transmit power changes between the reference packet and packet n.
It is clear that, any error in the estimation of the transmit power changes ampli­
tude will introduce additional noise in the measurements. However, the dynamics of 
the signal are still preserved and an attacker can use any variation in the signal over 
a short time period in order to notice motion of a person near the link line.
4.4.4 ZigB ee Networks
The methodologies described above are also applicable for IEEE 802.15.4 ZigBee 
nodes. However, the ZigBee nodes are generally equipped with a single antenna, 
so the MIMO setup is not available. Moreover, ZigBee nodes do not use OFDM 
for communication, so we use channel information from a single frequency channel 
(instead of averaging across all subcarriers as in the case of OFDM) to evaluate our 
methodologies. Furthermore, there is no tool to get the complete CSI at the receiver. 
Instead, we rely on the RSS value obtained from the receiver hardware. Thus, in 
the case of ZigBee we set Hj,k(n) to the RSS value measured in decibel units for 
the jth  transmitter-receiver antenna pair for packet n, also k =  1, Vj as we have 
measurements from a single channel only.
In order to create spatial diversity we use three closely located ZigBee receivers 
together to form a group as described in Section 4.5. We detect line crossings 
by applying our majority vote approach on the three links formed between the
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transmitter and the three receivers in the group. We detect direction of motion 
using two groups of receivers and observing sequence of groups crossed over a short 
time window. We estimate and compensate for artificial transmit power changes (if 
any) by applying the methods described in Section 4.4.3, and utilizing the fact that 
any change in transmit power affects all receivers simultaneously across all groups.
4.5 Experiments
In this section, we describe the experimental setup. Section 4.5.1 describes the 
tools we use to measure the wireless channel, Section 4.5.2 describes the transmit 
power changes we apply, and Section 4.5.3 describes two real-world experimental 
deployments.
4.5.1 T ool D escription
We use the following tools to measure the wireless channel and detect line cross­
ings.
4.5.1.1 W iF i
We use laptops with Intel 5300 NICs that have three-antenna MIMO 802.11n 
radios. We use the CSI Tool [20], that has been built for these radios, to get channel 
state information from the WiFi transmitter. The CSI tool extracts 802.11n channel 
state information for 30 subcarriers at each antenna pair. Since we use three antennas 
at each node for communication, for each transmitter-receiver pair, we have 3 x 3 =  9 
links each with 30 subcarrier groups. We use two kinds of antenna separations —  in 
the normal case (WiFLNORM), we place the antennas 6 cm apart, in the other case 
(WiFLSEP), we use a larger antenna separation of 30 cm. The increased separation 
is accomplished by connecting the antennas to the Intel 5300 NIC with standard RF 
cables that are long enough to provide up to 30 cm separation. We program the 
transmitter to transmit packets at a rate of 10 Hz which is similar to beacon frame 
rates of a standard wireless access point. The attack receivers use the CSI Tool to 
obtain channel state information from the received packets which in turn is used to 
detect line crossings as described in Section 4.4.1.
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4.5.1.2 ZigBee
For the ZigBee experiments, we use Texas Instrument CC2531 USB dongles, which 
are equipped with low-power, IEEE 802.15.4-compliant radios operating in the 2.4 
GHz ISM band. The transmission frequency in this case is 12 Hz. A laptop is used to 
process the measured data at the attack receivers. There is no tool to obtain the CSI 
information in the case of ZigBee nodes. Therefore, we use the RSS value (in dBm) 
measured by the receiver hardware for our analysis, as described in Section 4.4.4.
4.5.2 Transmit Power Variations
We consider three different settings of transmit power variations for our experi­
ments: while simulating effects of transmit power change we rely on the fact that any 
change in the transmit power at a time instant is observed across all subcarriers for all 
transmitter-receiver antenna pairs in case of WiFi and across all receivers in case of 
ZigBee at the same instant and we change the received signal parameters accordingly. 
We also add a zero mean Gaussian random variable (with standard deviation 0.67) 
to each Hj,k(n) measurement, in addition to the the transmit power change tx(n), to 
account for errors due to environmental noise.
4.5.3 Experim ental Deploym ents
We evaluate our methodologies in two different real world settings.
4.5.3.1 University Hallway
We choose a hallway inside a university building as the area being monitored 
(Figure 4.4(a)). The hallway is adjacent to a 30 cm thick and 3.5 m tall rebar- 
reinforced concrete boundary wall (Figure 4.4(b)). We note that this type of a wall 
causes significant RF attenuation at WiFi frequencies and represents a worst-case 
scenario among typical exterior walls for our purposes [76]. We place the attack 
receivers outside the boundary wall parallel to the hallway approximately 1 m away 
from the wall.
For the WiFi experiment, we deploy one transmitter inside the building across 
the hallway, and two attack receivers separated by 3 m outside the concrete wall 
(Figure 4.3(a)). Similarly, for the ZigBee network, we deploy one transmitter across
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the hallway and six receivers outside the boundary wall. The attack receivers are 
placed in two groups of three nodes each, with the distance between the groups being
3 m (Figure 4.3(a)). Nodes in the same group are almost 30 cm apart. We perform 
both TX_NORMAL and TX_RAND experiments with the same ZigBee setup. We 
also experiment with three different transmitter locations in the case of ZigBee.
During the experiment, a person walks back and forth along a predefined path 
(route in Figure 4.3(a)) along the corridor between the transmitter and the attack 
receivers. With the help of a metronome, the person walks at a constant speed of
0.5mm. We collect over 12, 000 data samples for WiFi and over 20, 000 data samples for 
ZigBee in this experiment. In our evaluation, we use ws =  4 s (short time window), 
wi =  40 s(long term window), and A =  4 s (Section 4.4.1).
4.5.3.2 Residential House
In this experiment, we monitor two sides of a residential house (Figure 4.3(b)) to 
detect people movement. We perform two sets of experiment with the WiFi nodes. In 
the first experiment (House 1), we place the WiFi transmitter in a corridor centrally 
located inside the house and two WiFi receivers with normal antenna separation 
(WiFLNORM) in the backyard of the house outside the external wall as shown in 
the Figure 4.3(b). The receivers are placed approximately 1 m away from each other. 
For the second experiment (House 2), we use two WiFi receivers with larger antenna 
separation (WiFLSEP) and place one of them in the backyard and the other outside 
the front entrance. The transmitter is placed in the same position as in experiment 
House 1.
For the ZigBee network, we place two groups of receivers, each group with three 
nodes, on either side of the house outside the external walls. As shown in Figure 
4.3(b), the ZigBee groups 1 and 2 are placed outside the front entrance, and groups 3 
and 4 are placed in the backyard, approximately 1 m away from the walls. Nodes in 
the same group are almost 30 cm apart while the intergroup distance on either side 
is at least 1 m. The ZigBee transmitter is placed inside the house colocated with the 
WiFi transmitter. We perform two sets of experiments with the same network settings 
—  in one experiment the ZigBee transmitter transmits with fixed transmit power of 
+4.5 dBm (TX_NORMAL), in the other experiment the transmitter is programmed
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to vary its transmit power randomly with each transmission (TX_RANDOM).
During these residential experiments, a person walks inside the house at normal 
speed back and forth first near the front entrance of the house (route 1 in the 
Figure 4.3(b)), and then in the living room which is near the rear end of the house 
(shown as route 2 in the Figure 4.3(b)). Finally, the person makes a few rounds 
inside the house as shown in route 3 in the Figure 4.3(b). We collect over 10, 000 
data samples for each set of ZigBee and WiFi experiments. We video record the line 
crossings to test the accuracy of our detection method against ground truth. For the 
residential experiments, we use ws =  2 s (short-term window), w\ =  20 s (long-term 
window) and A =  4 s (Section 4.4.1). We use smaller window sizes for detection of 
line crossings as the person walks at a faster speed as compared to the University 
Hallway experiments.
4.6 Results
We evaluate the performance of the ERW attack in terms of false alarm and missed 
detection rates. False alarm (FA) rates are calculated as the number of line crossings 
wrongly detected by the system over the number of sample points. Missed detection 
(MD) rates are calculated as the number of actual line crossings not detected by the 
system over the total number of actual line crossings.
4.6.1 D etection  o f  Line Crossing
In this section, we present the accuracy of detection of line crossings using the 
methodology as described in Section 4.4.1.
4.6.1.1 University Hallway
Table 4.1 lists the results obtained in the University Hallway experiment using 
our majority vote detection. We achieve almost 100% detection rate with few false 
alarms and missed detections. Using a WiFi 802.11n receiver with normal antenna 
separation, we get zero false alarms and only 1.92% missed detections. We compare 
the detected crossing times with those in the recorded video footage of the experiment 
and find that we can detect the crossing times with an average error of 0.79 s, with 
minimum and maximum errors of 0.03 s and 2.73 s, respectively.
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We obtain zero false alarms and missed detections when using a 802.11n WiFi 
receiver with a large spatial separation between antennas, the mean error in this case 
being 1.22 s. For ZigBee, using a group of three closely located receivers, we get a 
2.66% false alarm rate and a 1.67% missed detection rate in line crossing detection 
with an average error of 1.22 s. We use two groups of receivers and experiment with 
three different transmitter locations in case of ZigBee. We obtain the above results 
by averaging over all transmitter location and receiver group pairs.
Note that while computing the errors as compared to the ground truth, we consider 
the line connecting the centroid of transmitter antenna locations (or the transmitter 
location in case of ZigBee) and the centroid of the receiver antenna locations (or the 
centroid of the receiver locations in the group in case of ZigBee) as the representative 
link line.
4.6.1.2 Residential House
We present the detection accuracy of the Residential House experiment in Table 
4.2. We achieve greater than 94% detection accuracy with a 0.043% false alarm rate 
while using WiFi receivers with normal antenna separation (WiFLNORM). With 
larger antenna separation (WiFLSEP) the accuracy is above 95% with a 0.005% 
false alarm rate. The mean error in detection of line crossings is 1.06 s in case of 
WiFLNORM, the same being 0.56 s for WiFLSEP.
For ZigBee, we achieve above 99% accuracy in detection with a false alarm rate 
of 0.004% only. The mean time-of-crossing estimation in this case is 1.63 s. Note 
that during this experiment, we placed one group of ZigBee nodes (group 2) directly 
in front of the metal-plated entrance door. The packet reception rates for receivers 
in this group are much lower than the receivers in the other groups. Also, perhaps 
due to attenuation through the door, the RSS measurements made by this group are 
more noisy than those made by the other groups, leading to further degradation in 
performance. The missed detection rate for this group is almost 30%, about 60 times 
more than the average missed detection rate of other groups (results presented in 
Table 4.2 are averaged over the other three groups). Thus, we conclude that, although 
an ERW attack can penetrate concrete and brick walls, metallic structures in the line 
of sight path of the radio signals degrades the detection accuracy significantly.
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4.6.2 Determ ining D irection o f  M otion
In the following sections, we present the accuracy we achieve in detecting the 
direction of motion of the person in each experiment.
4.6.2.1 University Hallway
In the University Hallway experiment, the corridor was crossed by a moving person 
an equal number of times in either direction. We achieve 100% accuracy in detecting 
direction of movement on either side of the corridor while using two WiFi receivers 
or two groups of ZigBee nodes using the method described in Section 4.4.2.
We also achieve an accuracy as high as 90.38% in detecting direction of motion 
with only a single WiFi 802.11n receiver by increasing the spatial separation of the 
MIMO antennas. The accuracy with a single WiFi receiver with standard antenna 
separation is 59.62%, which is slightly better than guessing the direction of motion.
4.6.2.2 Residential House
In the Residential House experiment, we achieve 100% accuracy in detection while 
using two WiFi receivers with standard antenna separation (experiment House 1) 
or two groups of ZigBee nodes on either side of the house. Individual detection 
accuracy of the two WiFi receivers (with standard antenna separation placed on 
the same side of the house as in experiment House 1) used are 100% (RX1) and 
68% (RX2), respectively. Detection accuracy with spatially separated antennas for 
these receivers (when they are placed on opposite sides of the house as in experiment 
House 2) are 96% (RX1) and 52.6% (RX2), respectively. These results differ from the 
University Hallway experiment where we get better accuracy in detecting direction of 
movement while using large spatial separation between antennas as compared to using 
normal antenna separation. The degradation in accuracy with antenna separation in 
the Residential House experiment may be due to the fact that during the House
2 experiment, walking speed of the person was about 20% faster as compared to 
the House 1 experiment with normal antenna separation, hence crossing times for 
individual antennas overlapped with each other in some cases.
To summarize, our results indicate that an ERW adversary should use two WiFi 
receivers or two groups of ZigBee nodes at each side in order to detect direction of
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motion accurately. It is possible to achieve very high accuracy even with a single WiFi 
receiver in some cases (e.g., RX1 in experiments House 1 and House 2), however, the 
results depend on the environment and need further investigation.
4.6.3 Advantages o f  M ajority  V ote
In this section, we show how our majority vote approach helps overcome inherent 
uncertainties in wireless links. All wireless links are not equally sensitive to motion 
occurring in their vicinity and the sensitivity varies with link fade level along with 
other factors. For example, Figure 4.5 shows the RSS for the three ZigBee receivers 
belonging to group 1 used in the Residential House experiment for a time interval 
during which the person crossed in front the group two times. For RX1 and RX3, the 
overall RSS variance is very small. When the person crosses the link line, she causes 
high short-term variation of the RSS, as can be seen during time intervals [113 s - 116 
s] and [128 s - 131 s]. Thus, one can infer link crossing times monitoring for these high 
short-term variations in RSS for these links. However, the link to RX2 has very low 
mean RSS value with high variance overall. This link does not show clear short-term 
high variance region corresponding to actual link line crossings as compared to RX1 
or RX3. Hence, a line crossing detection method that relies only on the link to RX2 
will perform poorly.
Since it is not possible for an adversary to know beforehand whether a link is good 
or bad for detecting LOS crossings, he relies on correlation among multiple closely 
located links and infers a line crossing only when majority of these closely located 
links indicates a crossing. In our experiments, 3 x 3 =  9 links between the MIMO 
transmitter-receiver antenna pairs are considered for majority vote in the WiFi case, 
and groups of three single-antenna receivers in the ZigBee case. Figure 4.6 shows 
one scenario where our majority vote algorithm helps get rid of some false alarms 
and missed detections due to one bad WiFi link (for clarity we show three out of the 
nine links) from the University Hallway experiment. The link shown in Figure 4.6(b) 
fails to detect a line crossing that occurs around 100 s. However, the other two links 
(Figure 4.6(a) and Figure 4.6(c)) detect the crossing and a majority vote among these 
three links detects the crossing at that time (Figure 4.6(d)). Similarly, we see that
76
the link in Figure 4.6(b) flags a false alarm at 180 s but the other two links do not 
indicate any crossing. Again, the majority vote gets rid of the false alarm at time 180 
s (Figure 4.6(d)), thereby improving the overall accuracy of the system.
We summarize our findings as follows —  a single wireless link suffices in some 
cases in detection of line crossings between a transmitter and a receiver, however, 
the results are not always reliable due to inherent uncertainties in link sensitivity to 
object movements. We can improve accuracy and reliability by correlating detections 
across multiple colocated links using a majority vote approach. Our results confirm 
that we can get rid of most of the false alarms and missed detections caused by a bad 
link by applying the majority vote based detection method.
4.6.4 C om pensation for Transmit Power Change
In this section, we show how transmit power changes (random or strategic) affect 
line crossing detection accuracy and how our compensation method nullifies the effect 
of such power changes.
Figure 4.7(a) shows the effect of random transmit power changes on line crossing 
detection for a WiFi link between a single transmitter-receiver antenna pair that is 
crossed three times by a moving person. The top figure corresponds to the case 
when there is no transmit power change. This figure clearly shows distinct short time 
periods of high variance in the CSI corresponding to the times when the person crosses 
the link. However, transmit power change masks these distinct short-term variance 
regions and renders line crossing detection ineffective as can be seen in the figure in 
the middle. The bottom figure plots the CSI for the same link after compensating for 
the transmit power changes as described in Section 4.4.3. Clearly, our compensation 
method almost nullifies the masking effect of transmit power changes and the attacker 
can detect three line crossings (high short-term variance region) from the compensated 
signal.
Similarly, Figure 4.7(b) shows how strategic power changes can be used to simulate 
link line crossings, and how our compensation method eliminates these artificial 
variations. The top figure plots the RSS in dBm for a ZigBee link that is crossed 
during the time interval 856-860 s. The figure in the middle shows one additional 
line crossing (high variance region) introduced in the link by strategic transmit power
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changes during time interval 838-841 s. However, as seen from the bottom figure, 
our compensation method gets rid of the false alarm introduced by strategic power 
change and we can detect the original line crossing from the compensated signal.
In Figures 4.8 and 4.9, we show false alarms and missed detections induced by 
transmit power changes and the accuracy of our compensation method. In the 
figures, NORMAL corresponds to the case when the transmitter transmits with fixed 
transmit power, CRS is when strategic power changes are introduced in the data 
using TX_LINECROSS simulation, CRS_CMP corresponds to the results when we 
apply our compensation method on TX_CRS. Similarly, RND shows results when the 
transmitter is changing its transmit power randomly with each transmission, while 
RND_CMP is the corresponding compensation results. Note that the owner of the 
legitimate transmitter has full control over the transmitter node and can randomly 
select the periodicity with which to introduce transmit power changes in case of the 
TX_LINECROSS experiment. We present results for one such simulated scenario 
where the owner randomly selects a time period between 3 -  10 s to change transmit 
power according to a profile that mimics typical channel variation introduced by a 
person crossing the link line.
We see that transmit power changes (for both TX_LINECROSS and TX_RANDOM 
experiments) introduce significant false alarms and missed detections while using 
either WiFi (with or without spatially separated antennas) or ZigBee nodes. As an 
example, in the University Hallway experiment, a strategic transmit power change 
at the WiFi transmitter increases the missed detections rate from 1.92% to 32.69% 
and the false alarms rate from 0% to 0.199% when using a WiFi receiver with normal 
antenna separation. However, our compensation method gets rid of all the additional 
false alarms and missed detections. Similarly, in the Residential House experiment, for 
random power changes at the ZigBee transmitter, the missed detections rate increases 
to 31.37% from 0.94% and the false alarms rate increases to 0.429% from 0.003% but 
our compensation method brings down the missed detection and false alarm rates 
to only 0.94% and 0.006%, respectively. Using Equation 4.12, we can estimate the 
transmit power change amplitude accurately in 98% cases if we allow an error margin 
of ±2  dB.
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To summarize our findings, transmit power changes (strategic or random) in­
crease the false alarm and missed detection rates significantly. However, using our 
compensation method, an attacker can accurately estimate the transmit power change 
amplitude and compensate for the same to get rid of most the adverse effect caused 
by such changes and still sense people location and motion with high accuracy.
4.6.5 D etection  with Varying Transmission Rate
ZigBee applications in modern facilities use different transmission rates for com­
munication. In this section, we show how detection accuracy varies when the transmis­
sion rate for the ZigBee transmitter is lowered. We use the data from TX_NORMAL 
for both the University Hallway and Residential House experiment to simulate the 
effect of lower transmission rate. Note that the original transmission rate is ap­
proximately 12 Hz. We simulate three additional transmission rates —  6 Hz, 4 
Hz, and 2 Hz, respectively, from the original data. Figure 4.10 shows the results 
of our simulation. We find that the overall detection rates decrease with lower 
transmission rates. For the transmission rate of six transmissions/second, accuracy 
of the detector is over 98% for the University Hallway experiment and over 96% for 
the Residential House experiment. These results are similar to what we observe for 
original transmission frequency of 12 Hz. The accuracy is worst for transmission 
frequency of 2 Hz with the detection rate being as low as 71% for the Residential 
House experiment. For the transmission rate of 4 Hz, the detection rate degrades 
to 87% in the University Hallway experiment, although it remains above 96% for 
the Residential House experiment. We do not see any noticeable change in the false 
alarm rates with varying transmission rate.
We summarize our findings as follows: detection accuracy with ZigBee nodes 
decreases as transmission rate is lowered. For an ERW attack to succeed with high 
accuracy, the transmission frequency must be at least 6 transmissions/second.
4.7 Related Work
Preserving the privacy of the location of mobile devices in wireless networks has 
been object of intense research [77,78]. Location represents an important private 
information that can be used by malicious attackers for serious privacy violations and
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potentially dangerous attacks. The work in [79] presents an evaluation of the privacy 
and security of wireless tire pressure monitoring systems. It shows that eavesdropping 
on these systems is possible through their static identifiers even at a distance of 40 
m.
Other works have demonstrated that communicating wireless devices leak the 
current and past location of people carrying these devices. In [80], the authors show 
that distance bounding protocols [81] can leak distance and location information to 
an attacker overhearing the communication between the prover and the verifier to 
such an extent as to allow the attacker to estimate his own position relative to the 
two devices. They also introduce a location private distance bounding protocol that 
protects against malicious provers, passive eavesdroppers, and attackers trying to 
actively initiate a distance bounding session. In [82], the authors describe a system 
that can reveal the locations of WiFi-enabled mobile devices within the coverage 
area of a single high-gain antenna. By knowing the location and/or the maximum 
transmission range of the APs, an eavesdropper can set up a high-gain antenna to 
sniff the traffic between the victim  mobile device and the APs on all the available 
wireless channels and estimate the position of the mobile device. The work in [83] 
proposes three countermeasures to improve the location privacy in wireless networks,
i.e., anonymize the identity of the device by frequently changing its pseudonym during 
communications (as in [84]), unlink different pseudonyms of the same device with 
silent periods between different pseudonyms, reduce the transmission range of the 
devices through power control to minimize the number of APs that can collaborate 
to localize the devices’ location (the precision to which a mobile device can be located 
depends on how many APs can hear from the device [85]).
The works focusing on location privacy typically assume that the victims of the 
attack are carrying a wireless device (e.g., a mobile phone, radio frequency iden­
tification (RFID) tag, low-power radio transceiver) that is actively communicating 
with the surrounding network infrastructure (e.g., WiFi APs, RFID readers, other 
radio transceivers). The work in [86] presents a through-walls passive WiFi radar 
system. In it, a receiver is situated outside the target building and a Wi-Fi AP placed 
inside the building and having a narrow-beamwidth directional antenna is used as
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transmitter. The signal received by the passive radar detector is then used to create 
a range-Doppler surface and detect a moving target. Our work is complementary 
to [86] because through wall radar systems have limited range due to direct signal 
interference. Further, as they are based on transmission, they could be detected by 
source localization or counteracted by jamming. Other systems localize people by 
measuring the change in RSS of links traveling across an area where several WiFi 
APs or ZigBee radio transceivers are deployed. In the case of Wi-Fi based passive 
localization systems [72], a radio map of the environment is created by having a person 
standing at different locations while recording the RSS of all the links. This requires 
access to the target area for an initial calibration of the system. For radio tomographic 
systems [70], accurate localization of people requires a high density deployment of 
radio transceivers on all sides of the target area. In [87], the authors developed a 
method for through wall localization using WiFi signals. However, their method 
depends on active probing, i.e., a custom hardware sending WiFi signals through 
a barrier (e.g., a wall) and measuring the way it reflects back from objects on the 
other side. This active transmission of radio waves makes their work susceptible to 
detection and jamming. Our work relies on passive measurements using standard 
hardware and, hence, is immune to detection and jamming.
In this work, we demonstrate that the presence, location and movements of 
people not carrying any wireless device can still be eavesdropped by measuring the 
RSS of the links between the devices composing the legitimate network and few 
receivers positioned outside the target area. This can be achieved without requiring 
a complex network infrastructure or previous access to the target area for an initial 
calibration. In [88], the authors propose a method to detect an attack to a radio 
tomographic system in which some of the deployed radio transceivers are maliciously 
reprogrammed to change their transmit power. Our work is different in that we 
propose a method capable of correctly estimating the amplitude of the transmit 
power changes implemented by the legitimate devices as a countermeasure to the 
ERW attack. This enables reconstructing the true dynamics of the RSS signals and 
estimating people’s locations. Moreover, in our work we do not make any assumption 
on the number of transmitters changing their transmit power and on the periodicity
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and amplitude of such changes.
4.8 Conclusion and Future Work
We investigated the ability of an attacker to surreptitiously use an otherwise 
secure wireless network to detect moving people through walls. We designed and 
implemented an attack methodology for through wall people localization that re­
lies on reliably detecting when people cross the link lines by using physical layer 
measurements between the legitimate transmitters and the attack receivers. We 
also developed a method to determine the direction of movement of a person from 
the sequence of link lines crossed during a short time interval. Additionally, we 
described how an attacker may estimate any artificial changes in transmit power 
(used as a countermeasure), compensate for these power changes using measurements 
from sufficient number of links, and still detect line crossings. We implemented our 
methodology on WiFi and ZigBee nodes and experimentally evaluated the ERW 
attack by monitoring people movements through walls in two real-world settings. We 
found that our methods achieve close to 100% accuracy in detecting line crossings 
and the direction of movement, when we use two WiFi 802.11n nodes with normal 
antenna separation, or two groups of ZigBee nodes as attack receivers. We also found 
that our methods achieve 90 -  100% accuracy when we use a single 802.11n attack 
receiver.
Future work must develop more sophisticated protocols to prevent person loca­
tion information leakage. Device hardware enhancements may be necessary for this 
purpose.
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Figure 4.2. (a) Line crossing detection diagram. The attack receiver(s) measure 
channel state information from the legitimate transmitter. The MIMO antenna array 
at the receiver(s) allows the adversary to count line crossings and determine direction 
of motion. (b) Direction of motion is determined by fitting a line to the points 
created by the spatial indexes of the antennas which detect a line crossing and the 
corresponding packet indexes of the detections. The sign of the slope of the fitted 
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Figure 4.3. Experiment diagrams. We show maps of the (a) University Hallway and 
(b) the Residential House and mark the location of the legitimate transmitter(s) and 
the attack receivers. We also highlight the route(s) followed by the walking person.
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FA% MD% Min Max Mean
WiFLNORM 0 1.92 0.03 2.73 0.79
WiFLSEP 0 0 0.27 2.37 1.22
ZigBee 0 1.02 0.27 2.37 1.22

























(b) Attack receiver deployment
Figure 4.4. Experimental setup of ZigBee radios at the University Hallway experi­
















Figure 4.5. All links are not equally sensitive to movement —  RX1 and RX3 
measure high short-term variations in link RSS corresponding to person crossings 
(time intervals [113 s - 116 s] and [128 s - 131 s]). Such a distinct high variation 
region is not present in link to RX2.
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Figure 4.6. The majority vote over transmitter-receiver antenna pairs reduces false 
alarms and missed detections. (a),(b), and (c) show the results of the windowed 
variance based line crossing detection for a different antenna pair using WiFi. In (d), 
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Figure 4.7. Measured CSI and RSS (top) without and (middle) with TX power 
change; and (bottom) after compensation, which nullifies the effect of TX power 
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Figure 4.8. Compensation accuracy in the University Hallway experiment. Both 
strategic (CRS) and random (RND) transmit power variations increase (a) missed 
detections and (b) false alarms rate significantly. However, our compensation method 
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Figure 4.9. Compensation accuracy in the Residential House experiment. Both 
strategic (CRS) and random (RND) transmit power variations increase (a) missed 
detections and (b) false alarms rate significantly. However, our compensation method 























Figure 4.10. System performance in terms of (a) missed detection and (b) false 
alarm rates with varying ZigBee transmission rates during both experiments.
CHAPTER 5
TOWARD A RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE RTI 
SYSTEM FOR TACTICAL OPERATIONS 1 
5.1 Abstract
The ability for special operations forces (SOF) to rapidly deploy a through-wall 
tracking system upon arrival at a tactical operation, e.g., a hostage scenario, and 
thereby estimate the approximate locations of the people within the building, has the 
potential to lower the risk of the operation and save lives. We study the feasibility 
of a rapidly deployed radio-tomographic imaging (RTI) system for use in tactical 
operations by SWAT and other SOF, in which several low-power radio devices are 
placed around a building and used to image and track the motion of humans inside the 
building. Specifically, we identify and study the constraints of this application, such 
as the need for the sensor network to self-localize and self-calibrate with minimal input 
from the SOF. We implement and test, in a wide variety of experimental deployments, 
a real-time RTI tracking system which adheres to these constraints and provides 
valuable situational intelligence. We work in concert with local law enforcement and 
SWAT in order to obtain valuable feedback from end users. We show that our system 
is capable of providing useful tracking information (average errors of less than 2 m) 
even when the self-localization results are inaccurate (up to 3 m average error).
5.2 Introduction
This report describes progress in determining the feasibility of a new radio fre­
quency (RF)-based technology for through-building surveillance, specifically, deter-
1©[2013j. Reprinted, with permission, from D. Maas, J. Wilson, N. Patwari, “Toward a Rapidly 
Deployable RTI System for Tactical Operations,” in Proc. 8th IEEE International Workshop on 
Practical Issues in Building Sensor Network Applications (SenseApp), 2013.
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mining the positions of people inside a building using sensors placed only on the 
outside of the building. The enabling technology, RF tomographic imaging (RTI), 
uses a network of small, inexpensive wireless devices, placed around an area, to 
make measurements and estimate where people and objects are currently located 
in the area [9,65,67,69,89-93]. By using radio waves, the devices are able to image 
through walls, smoke, and other obstructions [10,94], a major advantage over light and 
infrared. We introduce the fundamentals of RTI in Section 5.3.1. The “see through 
walls” capability of RTI opens the door for many emergency response applications in 
which situational awareness is critical to save lives.
In this work we investigate the application of these technologies to a system for use 
in emergency response, specifically, for SWAT and military special operations forces 
(SOF). Consider the scenario of a SWAT team responding to a hostage situation. 
Upon arrival at the scene, golf-ball-sized RTI radios are placed, thrown, or tactically 
launched (from an M-32 or M203 launcher) around the building. Depending on the 
scenario, these might land on the ground, or be deployed so that they stick to the 
outside wall of the building. Once deployed, the radios communicate and form a mesh 
network. After the radios self-locate and form an accurate map of their own locations, 
they continuously measure received signal strength (RSS) on all of the pair-wise links 
in the network. The measurements are collected and processed in real-time to show 
the tracks and current locations of moving people and objects in the environment, 
as shown in Figure 5.1. These data from our system represent significant situational 
intelligence which may help save lives during the course of the SWAT operation. For 
example, SWAT commanders could decide which part of the building is furthest from 
people and thus may be their safest point of entry.
This paper details feasibility studies for a robust, rapidly deployable, commercial 
RTI system. In contrast to experimental research tests in which sensors are hand- 
placed, mapped, and manually calibrated, in a tactically-deployed system, sensors 
must self-localize, self-calibrate, and the network must automatically form and start 
to measuring RSS.
The sensors must self-localize because many tactical operations are time-critical, 
and SOF cannot take the time to map the locations of the nodes. Additionally,
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precisely measuring the node locations may put SOF personnel at risk.
The network must self-calibrate regardless of the number of people already present 
within the building being monitored. Previous RTI methods [10, 94] have required 
empty-building calibration measurements in order to generate accurate tracking re­
sults, but empty-building calibration measurements may not be possible in many 
tactical operations. Additionally, since our system can measure RSS on multiple 
wireless channels, a part of the self-calibration process involves deciding which chan­
nels represent the best source for tracking measurements in real-time.
We show that these capabilities are feasible, that robust localization performance 
can be achieved, and that a complete system with these capabilities would be very 
compelling for end users. In summary, a through-building surveillance system with 
the capabilities we demonstrate would be useful to SWAT and other SOF, and would 
help save lives.
Specifically, our paper describes the following achievements towards a complete 
RTI tracking system that could be operated and used by SOF:
• We implement in real-time kernel distance-based radio tomographic imaging 
(KRTI), an RTI method that has improved performance compared to previously 
reported attenuation-based RTI [9] and variance-based RTI (VRTI) [10,94]. We 
describe KRTI and its performance in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.4.1.
• Since sensors must self-localize using a combination of GPS, received signal 
strength (RSS) measurements, and minimal user input, before they can estimate 
the positions of people in the environment, we study the effects of poor self­
localization on tracking performance. Surprisingly, we find that the performance 
of KRTI degrades gracefully as the sensors’ self-localization errors increase. This 
result is discussed further in Section 5.5.3.
• We implement and test a particular sensor self-localization method, called 
distributed weighted multidimensional scaling (dwMDS) [95,96] that combines 
GPS, RSS, and building layout information for sensor self-localization. We de­
scribe dwMDS in Section 5.3.2 and show in Section 5.5.1.1 that our experiments 
yield an average sensor self-localization accuracy of about 1.5 m.
96
• We implement two types of sensor self-calibration. First, the KRTI system 
must know the histogram of RSS values on each link. We show this can be 
calculated in real-time from RSS data, without requiring any “empty-building” 
calibration. Empty-building calibration is impossible in emergency response 
applications, but has been used in most previous research [9,89,97]. Second, we 
choose upon deployment the best frequency channel for each link according to 
its fade-level. These two self-calibration methods are discussed in Section 5.3.3.
• We examine the use of directional antennas for through-building KRTI. We find 
that equipping sensors with directional antennas, compared to omnidirectional 
antennas, reduces average tracking error further, by as much as 22%. This 
result is described in Section 5.5.2.
• Finally, we study the effects of using different sized networks for KRTI and 
find that the number of sensors can be dramatically reduced compared to the 
30 or more used in previous research [9,94]. With only ten sensors, accurate 
localization (less than 1 m RMSE) can be achieved. This development is 
described in Section 5.5.3.
In summary, we show that a tactically deployed RTI system with a small number 
of sensors can perform sensor self-localization with minimal input from end users, can 
self-calibrate, and still provide high accuracy localization and tracking of people in 
a variety of experimental deployments. In addition, we collaborate extensively with 
local SWAT in order to get feedback on system deployment and usability. End user 
observations of a testbed deployment are described in Section 5.5.4.
5.3 Methodology
In this section we introduce the RTI method we implement to produce the images 
used to track human motion. Next, we discuss the method we use to allow the nodes 
to self-localize. Finally, we discuss network self-calibration.
5.3.1 R adio Tom ographic Im aging Im plem entation
Several methods for RTI-based location tracking have been introduced over the 
past few years [8,75,91,98]. In [9], the authors measure the average RSS on each link
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while the tracking area is empty and then determine where people are in the network 
based on changes in the RSS values for each link. In [10], the authors monitor the 
variance of the RSS on each link in order to localize motion in the network. This 
method has the benefit that it does not require offline calibration, but it cannot detect 
stationary targets.
Recently a new RTI method, kernel distance radio-tomographic imaging (KRTI) 
[92,99], was introduced which detects stationary and moving targets without the need 
for offline calibration. KRTI uses a kernel distance metric to quantify the difference 
between two histograms of RSS measurements for each link in order to track people 
within the network. Using histograms of RSS measurements combines the benefits 
of the methods presented in [9] and [10], quantifying changes in both the mean and 
the variance of RSS measurements for each link. An example of the images generated 
with KRTI and used for tracking is shown in Figure 5.2. The hot point in the image 
represents the position of the person being tracked.
In KRTI, a long-term histogram is used as a baseline, while a short-term histogram 
is used to track recent changes in RSS on each link. When applied to these two 
histograms for a given link, the kernel distance metric is an indicator of motion on or 
near the link. The results we present in this work rely on KRTI in order to perform 
tracking because it is well-suited to hostage and barricade situations, in that it does 
not require empty-building calibration measurements and is capable of running in 
real-time. We note that a background subtraction method like the one presented 
in [100] is also capable of determining these distributions without empty-building 
measurements, but includes more computational complexity.
5.3.2 Sensor N etwork Self-Localization
The proposed tracking system requires knowledge about the relative locations of 
the radio transceivers deployed around the building within which the human targets 
are to be tracked. More precise node localization leads to more accurate tracking, 
which would be valuable to end users like SWAT. Since a SWAT team may not have 
the time or be willing to put their personnel at higher risk in order to precisely 
measure out the node locations, the nodes should self-localize and begin to track 
people within the network with little or no help from the team deploying the system.
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There are several methods in the literature for localizing radios. They typically 
use the time of arrival (TOA) or received signal strength (RSS) of radio transmissions 
in order to estimate internode distances [101]. An ordination technique like multidi­
mensional scaling (MDS) [96] can then be applied to find a map of sensors that best 
fits the measured internode distances.
In this work, we implement and augment a type of MDS called distributed weighted 
multidimensional scaling (dwMDS) [96], an ordination method which, given a noisy 
set of interpoint distances, attempts to find the most likely arrangement of these 
points. In our case, these points correspond to the locations of the network nodes, 
and the interpoint distances are estimated using the maximum-likelihood estimator 
(MLE) for the large-scale path loss model in [47] and the RSS measurements made by 
the nodes. In order to mitigate the effects of fading error on the RSS measurements 
for each link, we use the average RSS over five channels for each link.
The dwMDS cost function is
S =  2 ^  wij(Sij -  dij(X ) )2 +  ^  riHx -  xi||2, (5.1)
i=j i
where 8ij is the estimated distance between nodes i and j , dij (X ) is the distance 
between nodes i and j  for the node location matrix X , wij is a weighting factor 
which represents the quality of the distance estimate, x i is the ith node location, 
Xi represents an a priori estimate of the ith node location, and ri is a weight that 
represents the quality of the a priori estimate. The Xi could come, for example, from 
GPS receivers attached to the nodes or from coarse location estimates contributed by 
the end user. The cost function is then minimized over the node location matrix X .
We envision that the user interface might include a method for the users to mark 
(for example, by tapping on a touch-screen) the approximate node locations (x;i) on 
a map or aerial image, similar to those provided by Google Maps. Building shapes 
could be directly inferred from the satellite imagery using edge detection. In addition, 
end users like SOF have access to building plans, which could also function as input 
to the software interface. We leave the design of the user interface for future work, 
but note that the shape of the building around which the nodes are deployed further
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constrains the locations of the nodes. We augment the dwMDS cost function in order 
to include the building shape constraint
S =  2 ^  wij(Sij -  dij(X ) )2 +  ^  ri||xi -  x i||2 +  a ^  ||x* -  p||2, (5.2) 
i=j i i
where p is the nearest point on the perimeter to x i and a is a weighting factor that 
represents the quality of the perimeter information.
Another possible way to improve network self-localization is to use nodes that 
include GPS capability. Current commercial GPS devices are capable of localizing 
to as little as 2 m within 30 s of deployment, and are inexpensive thanks to the 
rise of the mobile phone. The GPS-based node locations may be used as a priori 
information in (5.2) or in addition to it. In fact, if GPS can reliably localize to 2 m 
and the end user only requires coarse target tracking, RTI might be performed using 
the GPS measurements alone. It is important to note that GPS receivers require 
unobstructed views of the sky to accurately localize, so we may not be able to rely 
on GPS in situations where the nodes are not exposed to the sky.
5.3.3 Sensor Network Self-Calibration
The tracking system must also establish baseline RSS distributions for each link 
in order to quantify changes in RSS and localize motion. Since it is not possible 
for end users to remove the antagonists or hostages from a building in order to 
perform calibration measurements, these distributions must be estimated online. For 
multichannel KRTI, it is also necessary to decide which frequency channels to use. 
We describe our methods for online baseline RSS estimation and channel selection 
below.
5.3.3.1 Baseline RSS estim ation
KRTI relies on keeping two histograms of RSS measurements for each link in 
the network and comparing those distributions in order to determine whether or not 
people are moving near each link. Self- calibration after deployment occurs in real­
time by continuously calculating the long-term histogram and using it as a baseline 
for detecting human motion. The long-term histogram converges to what would be 
seen in a calibration to be useful for finding both moving and stationary people in the
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building. The convergence speed is adjustable, but we find that good performance 
is achieved with parameters that require about 30 s for convergence. According to 
our end user contacts, most barricade scenarios last long enough (sometimes multiple 
days) to allow such a convergence time. We note that people must move periodically 
in order for our tracking system to locate them. If they remain stationary for a period 
of time beyond the memory of both histograms, they will disappear from the tracking 
image.
5.3.3.2 Channel Selection
We leverage frequency diversity in our test system and demonstrate through 
multiple experiments that it improves tracking performance. The fading experienced 
by each link in the network is frequency selective, i.e., the RSS is different due to the 
different constructive or destructive combinations of the multipath components as a 
function of frequency. Transmitting on multiple channels makes it more likely that a 
channel will be found on which each link can be used reliably for RTI.
The best channels for RTI are those in an antifade, because the RSS on these 
channels are typically strongly affected only when a human target is blocking the line 
between the two nodes of the link, and not when he is moving at other positions [97]. 
In other words, antifade links are the most spatially informative [69,102]. For each 
link, we choose the channel with the highest average RSS, because these channels are 
most likely to be in an antifade. There are other options for combining information 
from multiple channels, e.g., using the best n channels, but we leave the exploration 
of these options for future work. For multichannel KRTI, we allow an additional 30 s 
for channel selection, leading to a total of 60 s for calibration and channel selection.
5.4 Experiments
In this work, we present results both from real-time experiments as well as exper­
iments that were used in postprocessing for analysis of system design. We perform 
experiments at the following sites (the building layouts are presented in Figure 5.3):
• Site A: A 110 m2 single floor of a modern home in a typical suburb, comprised 
of four rooms and a bathroom. (33 nodes deployed)
101
• Site B: A 50 m2 building comprised of 2 rooms. (34 nodes deployed)
• Site C: A 55 m2 living space comprised of a single room. (36 nodes deployed)
In each case, Texas Instruments CC253X-based nodes are deployed as uniformly 
as possible around the perimeter of the building and data are collected using 8 
dBi directional and omnidirectional antennas while a human target follows planned 
routes throughout the building. The tracking data are analyzed in postprocessing 
to determine the accuracy of the system. We study the tracking performance when 
fewer nodes are used to surround each location by using RSS measurements made at 
a subset of the nodes from each deployment. Additionally, we study the effects of 
poor node self-localization by adding noise to the known locations of the nodes.
5.4.1 Tracking
Before pursuing our research objectives relating to self-localization and self-calibration, 
we first evaluate the tracking performance of a system when the node locations are 
known exactly for each of the three experiments. Knowing the performance with 
exact node locations is important as a baseline for evaluating the effect of automatic 
configuration on tracking accuracy during rapid deployment.
5.4.2 N ode Self-Localization
In order to test the accuracy of node self-localization methods like dwMDS, we 
precisely record the positions of each node during each deployment. During the 
calibration phase immediately after each deployment, we apply dwMDS in order to 
estimate the relative locations of the nodes.
We are also interested in the performance of our tracking system in the presence 
of imperfect knowledge of the node locations. In order to understand the effects of 
poor node self-localization, we simulate the circumstance by adding Gaussian noise 
to the true node locations and comparing the corresponding tracking results to those 
we achieve with the correct node locations.
5.4.3 A ntenna T ype
The use of better radio hardware may improve the performance of an RTI tracking 
system. For example, we are interested in determining whether or not the use of
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directional antennas results in better tracking performance. Previous research of 
RTI [9, 10] has relied primarily on omnidirectional antennas, which radiate more 
energy away from the tracking area than they do into it. We expect that the more 
focused gain pattern of the directional antennas should maximize the amount of 
power being radiated through the building, as opposed to away from it or around it, 
leading to a more connected network, a higher average fade level, and better tracking 
performance. Maximizing the power radiated into the building is especially important 
in through-building imaging, where the signal may need to propagate through multiple 
exterior and interior walls.
In order to examine the benefits of directional antennas for our application, we 
first perform each experiment with radios that include a PCB microstrip inverted-F 
antenna with an omnidirectional gain pattern. We then repeat the experiment using 
circularly polarized 8 dBi directional antennas. In each case, we set the transmitted 
power for our radios to the maximum power allowed by the hardware in order to 
increase network connectivity as much as possible.
5.4.4 N etwork Size
It is important to understand the trade-off between the number of nodes in the 
RTI network and the corresponding tracking accuracy, because the tracking system 
must offer a fast and simple deployment in order to be useful to the end users. In 
some barricade scenarios the hostile targets may be armed, making it dangerous for 
SOF to spend time setting up nodes around the perimeter of the building. In these 
cases, smaller networks may allow for safer deployments and still offer useful tracking 
data. For example, using 30-40 nodes may allow for tracking a person to within 0.3 
m of their true location, but the end user may wish to sacrifice some accuracy in 
order deploy the system quickly in a dangerous situation, e.g., using 10 nodes and 
accepting a tracking error of 1 m.
We examine the tracking performance for networks which include 10 to 36 nodes. 
At each experimental deployment, the nodes are placed around the perimeter of the 
building in an approximately equally spaced pattern.
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5.4.5 C ollaboration  with End Users
In order to understand the constraints of the potential end users of our system, we 
collaborate with one of Utah’s largest SWAT operations, the Unified Police Depart­
ment in Salt Lake City. The purpose of our collaboration is to obtain explicit feedback 
about our proposed system, whether it would actually help in tactical operations, and 
what physical constraints need to be addressed in order for such a system to become 
important and useful to end users.
We organize an extensive through-building tracking demonstration day for mem­
bers of the SWAT team and other law enforcement agencies in order to deploy our 
tracking system around a home in Salt Lake City and simulate hostage and barri­
cade scenarios while law enforcement officers offer valuable feedback about system 
deployment and performance.
5.5 Results
We present the major results from our experimental deployments below. We 
discuss general tracking results in Section 5.5.1, self-localization results and the 
corresponding effects on tracking performance in Section 5.5.1.1, a comparison of 
tracking performance for directional and omnidirectional antennas in Section 5.5.2, 
and the effects on tracking performance of using fewer nodes in Section 5.5.3. Finally, 
we discuss the feedback from local SOF after a real-time demonstration of the system 
in Section 5.5.4.
5.5.1 Tracking
At Site A, with exact locations of nodes known, an average tracking error of 
approximately 1.1 m was achieved with 33 nodes over 110 m2. At Site B, an average 
tracking error of 0.46 m was achieved with 34 nodes over 50 m2. At Site C, an average 
tracking error of 0.54 m was achieved with 36 nodes over 55 m2. Some tracking results 
for Sites A and B are depicted in Figure 5.4.
We expect that with a higher density of nodes per unit area, we should see a lower 
average tracking error, and this can be seen in the results presented in Table 5.1. 
As seen in Figure 5.6, Sites B and C, which are approximately the same size and 
have similar node-to-area ratios, show similar average tracking results. Site A, which
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represents a larger area and is covered with less nodes, shows slightly higher average 
tracking error.
While these tracking results would be beneficial according to our SOF contacts, 
they are achieved using near-perfect knowledge of the node locations, which SOF 
may not have access to in most scenarios. The sequel discusses node self-localization 
results.
5.5.1.1 Effect o f  Self-localization Error
In Figure 5.5(a), we show the dwMDS results for Site A without any a priori 
information about the node locations (ri =  0 for all i), which yield an average error 
of 3.3 m. The reason for the high average error is the rich multipath environment 
of the building, which leads to small-scale fading, and the failing of the large scale 
path loss model. We will show later that we can still achieve acceptable human 
target tracking results with this level of error in the network self-localization, but we 
can improve the localization by including some information from the end user about 
the deployment, specifically, a priori estimates of the node locations and building 
perimeter shape.
Figure 5.5(b) shows the results of dwMDS for Site A with coarse (2 m average 
error) a priori node locations and an the augmented cost function (5.2). In this case 
we achieve an average error of 1.5 m.
We note that our work investigates the accuracy of target tracking vs. the accuracy 
of node locations regardless of the methods used to localize the nodes. As expected, 
the accuracy of tracking decreases as the error of node location increases. However, 
keeping the mean squared error (MSE) of the node location estimates below 4 m2 
allows for average tracking errors of less than 1.5 m. The results are presented in 
Figure 5.6.
5.5.2 D irectional vs. O m nidirectional Antennas
Figure 5.6 shows the tracking performance at each experiment site vs. error 
variance in the network self-localization for both antenna types. Directional antennas 
offer better performance at Site A, but the two types of antennas result in similar 
performance at Sites B and C.
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The difference in the performance may be due in part to network connectivity: 
Site A shows improved connectivity, in terms of packet reception rates, when using 
directional antennas instead of omnidirectional antennas, while Sites B and C exhibit 
similar network connectivity regardless of antenna type.
5.5.3 N um ber o f  N odes
Figure 5.7 shows the tracking results from each site, for network sizes ranging from 
10 to 30 nodes, and both antenna types. Tracking results for the maximum number 
of nodes at each site can be seen in Figure 5.6. Surprisingly, we find that with as few 
as ten nodes, we are able to achieve less than 1.3 m average tracking error in most 
cases. If we guess randomly and uniformly at the location of the target across the 
area of the deployments at Sites A, B, and C, we find average errors of 6.0 m, 3.6 m, 
and 3.8 m, respectively.
The tracking accuracy appears to improve with the number of nodes. Although 
our experiments used a maximum of 36 nodes, we would expect that further increasing 
the number of nodes will further decrease the tracking error.
5.5.4 End User Feedback
After demonstration of our through-building tracking system, we interviewed 
SWAT commander Lt. Jake Petersen to receive his feedback and advice regarding 
the system. The following are quotes from the interview with their respective times 
in the video. The interview in its entirety can be found at http://w ww.youtube. 
com/watch?v=QnQKfz-AEi4. Note that a portion of the tracking demo is contained 
in the video at time 1:00.
• “This is something that I would use on really any barricaded subject or any 
hostage situation. Pinpointing exactly where the individual is, or even the 
hostages, allows us to make a save for these victims much easier. Really it is 
going to save lives, that’s the mission of SWAT.” (1:45)
• “Making sure that the technology works is really important and you’ve given 
me a lot of confidence in that here today.” (4:20)
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• “I would not be here if I didn’t think that this product could save lives, that’s 
the honest truth.” (16:16)
• “I want to save their lives, and I believe this kind of thing could help us do 
that.” (17:00)
5.6 Conclusion
We have examined the feasibility of a rapidly deployable through-building RTI 
system for SWAT and other SOF. We have shown that our system can rapidly self- 
localize and self-calibrate after deployment. The self-localization process requires 
minimal input from the user, and the system produces useful tracking results even 
when the node self-localization contains errors. We have also seen that directional 
antennas help increase through-building tracking accuracies as more power is radiated 
through the area of interest. Future development may use higher-power transmitters 
that provide full connectivity for larger building sizes.
Finally, through our interviews with SOF end users, we have further validated 
the need for this technology in tactical operations. We have shown that a simple, 
rapidly deployable, and user-friendly through-building tracking system is technically 
feasible. Future work will include the development of a user interface for SOF that 
will allow them to input deployment information, e.g., the building shape and coarse 
node locations, into the system, and then coordinate operations on top of the tracking 
data it generates.
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Figure 5.1. System overview. Special operations forces arrive at a building, deploy 
mesh network nodes around the perimeter of the building, and estimate the locations 
of people moving inside.
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Figure 5.2. Example image for multichannel KRTI.
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Figure 5.4. A subset of tracking results from: (a) Site A using directional antennas 
and multichannel KRTI resulting in an average error of 1.1 m; (b) Site B using 
directional antennas and multichannel KRTI resulting in an average error of 0.46 m.
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Table 5.1. Average tracking error for best antenna type at each site compared to 
random estimator and number of nodes.
Site A Site B Site C
10-node system 1.27 m 1.19 m 0.89 m
20-node system 1.22 m 0.70 m 0.68 m
30-node system 1.01 m 0.49 m 0.58 m






Figure 5.5. Multichannel dwMDS (a) without a priori information or augmented 





Figure 5.6. Average tracking error vs. mean squared error of node locations for 





Figure 5.7. Average tracking error vs. number of nodes deployed for directional and 
omnidirectional antennas at (a) Site A, (b) Site B, and (c) Site C.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
This dissertation is concluded with a summary of the most important findings in 
in the work. Ongoing and future work are then discussed.
6.1 Research Summary
The ubiquity of wireless networks (Cellular, WSN, WiFi LAN, Bluetooth PAN) 
transmitting in the RF range is leading to new applications for measurements made 
at the physical layer of the network stack. Channel measurements, e.g., estimates of 
the CIR made with channel sounders or the RSS estimates commonly made available 
to the application layer of the network stack by commodity wireless devices, are now 
being leveraged to sense the environment of the network.
Part of this dissertation is an effort to improve the tool-set used for CIR impulse 
response measurement by wireless communication researchers. To that end, I have 
helped build an open source 802.11b channel sounder on top of the popular GNU 
Radio software defined radio platform. The sounder is capable of receiving and de­
coding standard 802.11b packets at 1 Mbps and 2 Mbps data rates at full bandwidth, 
improving on previous receivers [46] by match filtering the incoming packets on the 
FPGA of the USRP before sending data through USB to the host PC. This tool 
has been downloaded over 1000 times since release. The tool has been validated in 
controlled experiments in the lab as well as in a variety of real-world environments.
I have also conducted a study of the methods for using CIR measurements to 
perform location distinction, specifically, in the context of MIMO communications, 
leading to an understanding of the trade-offs between different aspects of system 
complexity and system performance. Key findings include the knowledge that a 
system with two antennas offers nearly as much improvement in location distinction
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performance as a system with eight antennas, and that measurement bandwidths 
beyond 20 MHz offer diminishing returns because of the tendency of lower bandwidth 
measurements to mask the effects of timing synchronization errors. Finally, the 
MIMO location distinction system is capable of accurately detecting changes in re­
ceiver position using measurements for just one transmitter, while accurate detection 
in previous work using SISO devices has required multiple links.
Part of this dissertation is concerned with exploiting the so-called “radio windows” 
created by infrastructure wireless networks. This work shows that, using ambient 
secured radio signals emitted by a building’s WiFi or ZigBee network, an attacker 
outside of the building can infer location information about the people within the 
building. This information includes their direction of motion and what side of the 
building they are on, and is based on the detection of people crossing the LOS radio 
links between a legitimate transmitter inside the building and an illegitimate receiver 
placed outside the building by the attacker. The work also examines possible defenses 
for this attack. A key finding is that we can identify line crossings and direction of 
motion through walls with greater than 90% accuracy using just a single 802.11n 
attack receiver.
It should be noted that we did not use GNU Radio /  USRP channel sounder or 
the National Instruments 2x2 MIMO channel sounder for the “radio window” work 
because a cheaper and more portable measurement system, the CSI Tool [20], became 
available. This tool, which makes 3x3 MIMO OFDM channel measurements on WiFi 
packets, provides higher quality measurements across larger bandwidths than the 
other tools are capable of, and does so at a significantly lower cost.
The CSI Tool relies on a common Intel NIC with a modified firmware/driver. No 
other specialized hardware is necessary, showing that it is feasible to make information- 
rich channel measurements available to the application layer on commodity hardware. 
Location distinction performance using measurements made with this tool, or similar 
measurements made with other commodity NICs, would be as robust as the perfor­
mance achieved using measurements made by the sounders used in Chapter 3. I hope 
that this and other useful applications, e.g., secret key sharing and fingerprint-based 
localization, encourage NIC designers to make channel measurements available higher
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in the network stack.
The final part of this dissertation is concerned with bringing the benefits of 
through-wall imaging and tracking to SWAT teams and other special operations 
forces by making a rapidly deployable and robust RTI system. One key finding 
in this feasibility study are that the node locations in an RTI network do not need 
to be known very accurately to achieve useful tracking results, and can be estimated 
through an RSS-based method like dwMDS. Additionally, we find that as few as 
10 nodes can be used in a deployment, while still offering useful tracking results. 
A method like KRTI can be used to alleviate the need for offline calibration, while 
maintaining the ability to image people that are stationary for short periods of time. 
Finally, directional antennas offer better connectivity and RTI performance, since less 
transmit power is being radiated away from the building.
6.2 Ongoing and Future Work
At the time of this writing, I am continuing research efforts to develop a rapidly 
deployable and robust RTI system. This includes studying the effects of system 
parameters on tracking performance and automating parameter selection, so the end 
user does not have to, and examining the possibility of online adaptation of the RTI 
weighting matrix in order to improve image quality. It also includes developing a 
2.5D RTI algorithm that uses multiple radio channels and takes into consideration 
the level of multipath fading for each link when creating the weighting matrix.
Future work should address the radio window problem. Currently, countless homes 
and other buildings contain wireless networks that expose them, on some level, to 
anyone with a cellular phone, tablet, or laptop. A savvy thief, for example, can make 
a good guess as to whether or not a building is vacant based on measuring signal 
strength changes over time on its wireless network.
Perhaps the problem can be solved using algorithms that disguise the effects of 
humans on infrastructure wireless signals in subtle ways that are less susceptible to 
detection and removal than the method discussed in Chapter 4. The radio window is 
becoming even more of an issue with the introduction of less costly and more powerful 
consumer-grade software defined radios, which can go further than measuring signal
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strengths on the network. For example, with a single software defined radio, it is 
possible to detect the respiration rate of a person. So, the most savvy of thieves 
could potentially find out whether or not you are home, even if you remain perfectly 
still.
This work has been focused on making radio channel measurements of different 
types and using them to (a) localize people moving in the area covered by a wireless 
network and (b) detect the motion of the radios that make up the wireless network. 
The former tends to be the harder of these two tasks, since a person moving in the 
environment of a radio link will only affect a subset of the multipath that contribute to 
the CIR, while the motion of one of the radios that make up the link will affect most of 
the multipath. Using RSS as a channel difference metric makes both problems harder, 
since multiple positions of a person or radio can lead to similar RSS measurements. 
Therefore, future research should apply RTI methods to CIR measurements instead 
of RSS measurements. It is possible that this would lead to RTI systems that require 
fewer radios and that are therefore less expensive and easier to deploy. Further, using 
CIR measurements, it should be possible to improve radio self-localization in the RTI 
network, also leading to better performance.
APPENDIX
RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE RTI 
ADDENDUM
This addendum is included as a supplement to the reprinted paper [19]. In 
Section A.1, I briefly discuss a link budget analysis for through-wall RTI systems. 
In Section A.2, I discuss the effect of randomly selecting the subset of radios used 
on tracking performance for through-wall RTI.
A.1 Link Budget Considerations for 
Through-Wall RTI
The radio links in a through-wall RTI system must penetrate multiple interior and 
exterior walls, as well as the furniture, appliances, and people that are in the building. 
Since the radios in the system must operate with finite transmit power and receiver 
sensitivity, it is important to consider the link budgets of the radios that comprise 
the system. While it is impossible to perfectly model the effects of every possible 
deployment environment for RTI, a link budget allows us to determine whether or 
not a given deployment is likely to have the connectivity necessary to perform RTI 
given the power constraints of the system and the size of the deployment.
A log-normal path loss model, which includes the losses contributed by free-space 
propagation and shadowing, is augmented with a fade margin term in order to capture 
the effects of multipath fading, and an additional shadowing term which represents 
the losses caused by the external walls. This model represents the received power for 
any link in the network as
d
(d)dB =  PT +  GT +  — LC — LP (d0) — 10n logl0 X o- — — (A.1)do
where is the received power, d is the distance from transmitter to receiver, is
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the transmitted power, GT is the gain of the transmitter antenna, GR is the gain of the 
receiver antenna, LC is the loss caused by cables and connectors, LP(dQ) represents 
the path loss at reference distance dQ, n is the path loss exponent, X a is a zero mean 
Gaussian random variable with standard deviation a, which accounts for random 
shadowing losses, L f is the fade margin term, and Lw represents the wall losses.
The TI radios used for the experiments performed in [19] offer a typical transmit 
power of 4.5 dBm and a typical receiver sensitivity of -97 dBm. The antenna gain 
of the directional antennas used for the experiments (transmit and receive) is 8 dBi. 
In [103], a study of indoor propagation at 2.4 GHz, LP(dQ) is found to be 50 dB with 
dQ =  3 m, n is found to be 3.73, and a is found to be 4.35 dB for NLOS links. The 
cable and connector losses are approximately 2 dB. A good rule-of-thumb fade margin 
for indoor environments is 25 dB [104].
The wall loss term Lw is specific to the material and thickness of the exterior 
walls. In [105], a study of propagation losses through common building materials, the 
authors find the transmission losses shown in Table A.1. If, for example, the exterior 
walls are made of two-layers of red brick, and all links must links pass through two 
exterior walls, Lw «  17.7 dB. Substituting the corresponding values into (A.1) and 
simplifying yields
d
PR(d)dBm =  — 74-2 — 37-3l°glO 3  — X ct=4.35 (A .2)
Figure A .1 shows (A.2) for distances up to 20 m, with the dashed lines representing 
the positive and negative standard deviations. In this example, a reliable network for 
RTI is probable as long as the radio links are less than 9 m in length. Longer links 
will require an increase in transmit power, antenna gain, or receiver sensitivity.
A.2 Further Tracking Results
In [19], I examined the effect of using fewer radios for through-wall RTI by only 
including measurements from a subset of the radios deployed in each experiment. A 
single subset was chosen such that the radios it contained surrounded the site with 
roughly even spacing between adjacent radios. However, it is possible to choose more 
than one subset of a given size. Since some radio links are better than others for RTI, 
e.g., due to fade level, different radio subsets may offer different tracking performance.
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In this addendum, I have included Figure A.2, which shows the subset average 
tracking errors for each experiment site. The subset average tracking error is the 
result of averaging the mean tracking errors over multiple subsets for each network 
size. Subsets for a network of N radios are selected such that the N radios are 
evenly distributed around the experiment site. When N is less than half of the radios 
originally deployed for an experiment site, this is accomplished by selecting every kth 
radio, where k is as large as possible given the number of radios deployed. When N 
is greater than half of the radios originally deployed, this is accomplished by pruning 
every kth radio, where k is as large as possible given the number of radios deployed. 
Different subsets for a given network size are created by shifting the selection/pruning 
by a single radio. This leads to 4 subsets for N =  10, 3 subsets for N =  15, and 2 
subsets for N =  20, 25, 30.
Although the results differ slightly from those presented in Figure 5.7, the general 
trends and conclusions about decreasing the number of radios in the deployment 
remain the same: (a) the directional antennas tend to offer better tracking perfor­
mance than the omnidirectional antennas, (b) the tracking error goes gracefully with 
decreasing number of radios.
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Figure A.1. Received power for a through-wall link according to (A.2). The black 
dashed lines represent a positive and negative standard deviation. The red line 
represents the receiver sensitivity, below which it is unlikely that the receiver will 
be able to detect and decode packets. In this case, to achieve a reliable network for 








Figure A .2. Subset average tracking error vs. number of nodes deployed for 
directional and omnidirectional antennas at (a) Site A, (b) Site B, and (c) Site C. 
While the tracking results depicted in Figure 5.7 come from a single subset of radios 
for each network size, those shown here come from averaging the mean tracking error 
over multiple subsets of radios for each network size.
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